Regulating Derivatives: A Fundamental  Rethinking by Schwarcz, Steven L.
SCHWARCZ IN  PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 11/16/2020 7:38 PM 
 
REGULATING DERIVATIVES:  
A FUNDAMENTAL RETHINKING 
STEVEN L. SCHWARCZ† 
ABSTRACT 
The conventional wisdom is that derivatives are exotic and uniquely 
risky, although innovative, financial instruments. That perception has 
given rise to a regulatory patchwork described as “confusing, 
incomplete, [and] contradictory.”1 This Article rethinks how 
derivatives should be regulated. It begins by demystifying derivatives. 
In contrast to the arcane industry-derived categories, the Article 
deconstructs derivatives more intuitively, by their economic functions, 
into two categories of traditional legal instruments—option contracts 
and guarantees. Being neither exotic nor uniquely risky, most 
derivatives should be regulated like those traditional instruments. The 
Article then explains why at least one subset of guarantees—financial 
guarantees with systemically important counterparties, which are 
epitomized by credit-default swap derivatives—can seriously threaten 
economic stability and why the absence of an insurable-interest 
requirement can further magnify that threat. Finally, the Article 
examines how to design regulation that efficiently targets that threat. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The standard definition of a derivative is a financial contract about 
an underlying asset or assets from which the contract derives its value.2 
This definition, which is followed by the International Swaps and 
 
 2. Lynn A. Stout, Derivatives and the Legal Origin of the 2008 Credit Crisis, 1 HARV. BUS. 
L. REV. 1, 6 (2011).  
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Derivatives Association (“ISDA”),3 the leading industry trade 
organization,4 suggests that derivatives are exotic and complex, though 
possibly innovative, financial instruments.5 An early history of highly 
publicized losses by large and sophisticated investors also suggests that 
derivatives are inherently riskier than other financial instruments.6 
Reinforced by politicians and the media, these perceptions are widely 
shared, even by scholars.7  
Especially since the 2007–2008 financial crisis (“financial crisis”), 
many observers believe that derivatives are also systemically risky,8 
threatening economic stability by undermining the ability of the 
 
 3. See Glossary, INT’L SWAPS & DERIVATIVES ASS’N, https://www.isda.org/1970/01/01/
glossary [https://perma.cc/YH6N-X4F9] (defining a derivative as a “financial instrument that . . . 
derives its value from the price or rate of some other underlying assets such as bonds, loans, 
equities, currencies, commodities, indices, published rates or combinations of those assets”). 
 4.  See About ISDA, INT’L SWAPS & DERIVATIVES ASS’N, https://www.isda.org/about-isda 
[https://perma.cc/3TKD-XF3F]. See generally Gina-Gail S. Fletcher, Engineered Credit Default 
Swaps: Innovative or Manipulative?, 94 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1073 (2019) (discussing ISDA).  
 5.  See, e.g., Dan Awrey, Split Derivatives: Inside The World’s Most Misunderstood 
Contract, 36 YALE J. ON REG. 495, 503–04 (2019) [hereinafter Awrey, Split Derivatives] 
(discussing derivatives’ complexity); Dan Awrey, Complexity, Innovation, and the Regulation of 
Modern Financial Markets, 2 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 235, 245–58 (2012) (same); Timothy E. Lynch, 
Derivatives: A Twenty-First Century Understanding, 43 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1, 9 (2011) (referring to 
a common understanding of derivatives as “complex” and “exotic”); Steven McNamara, Financial 
Markets Uncertainty and the Rawlsian Argument for Central Counterparty Clearing of OTC 
Derivatives, 28 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 209, 218 (2014) (comparing derivatives 
with securities transactions). 
 6.  In April 1994, Procter & Gamble Co. announced a $157 million trading loss speculating 
on interest rates through derivatives. Gabriella Stern & Steven Lipin, Procter & Gamble to Take 
a Charge To Close Out Two Interest-Rate Swaps, WALL ST. J., Apr. 13, 1994, at A3. Several 
months later, Orange County, California, filed for bankruptcy protection due to a $2.5 billion loss 
speculating on exotic financial instruments that included derivatives. Laura Jereski, Orange 
County Fund Losses Put at $2.5 Billion, WALL ST. J., Dec. 12, 1994, at A3. These investors’ 
sophistication did not extend to derivatives.  
 7.  See Lynch, supra note 5, at 9 (“[R]egulatory, policy, and even legal discussions of 
derivatives are often muddled and demonstrate persistent misunderstandings of what derivatives 
are.”); Stout, supra note 2, at 22–31 (arguing that the enactment in 2000 of the Commodities 
Futures Modernization Act set the stage for the 2007–2008 financial crisis by legalizing speculative 
nonexchange trading in derivatives, thereby dramatically increasing systemic risk); see also supra 
note 5.  
 8.  See, e.g., ERNST & YOUNG, DODD-FRANK’S TITLE VII – OTC DERIVATIVES REFORM 
1 (2013), https://www.eyjapan.jp/library/issue/us/gaap-weekly-update/pdf/GAAP-2012-10-25-02-
01.pdf [https://perma.cc/792T-24GB] (“Congress viewed the lack of regulation of OTC derivatives 
transactions as exacerbating the 2008 financial crisis . . . .”). OTC derivatives generally refer to 
over-the-counter, or privately negotiated, derivatives transactions. Id. at Introduction; see also 
infra text accompanying note 244.  
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financial system to function as a network.9 The media portrayed 
American International Group (“AIG”)—which was potentially liable 
under multiple derivatives contracts to investors in mortgage-backed 
securities (“MBS”)10—as a poster child for that crisis.11 And even 
before the financial crisis, Warren Buffet famously referred to 
derivatives contracts as “financial weapons of mass destruction.”12 
Derivatives regulation is largely premised on these perceptions, 
spawning laws that regulate most derivatives alike as if they are 
inherently riskier than other financial instruments (hereinafter, 
“uniquely risky”).13 That blunderbuss strategy can backfire, however.14 
For example, although U.S. and foreign regulation requires most 
derivatives contracts to be cleared and settled through central 
 
 9.  See Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193, 204, 207–08 (2008) [hereinafter 
Schwarcz, Systemic Risk] (defining systemic risk as risk that threatens the ability of the financial 
system to function as a network, thereby jeopardizing the real economy). References in this 
Article to “economic stability” and “financial stability” are intended to be synonymous, meaning 
the stability of the real economy.  
 10.  See Christoph Henkel, Harmonizing European Union Bank Resolution: Central 
Clearing of OTC Derivative Contracts Maintaining the Status Quo of Safe Harbors, 22 
TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 81, 97 (2013) (explaining that AIG was “unable to post 
sufficient collateral to ensure meeting its [margin] obligations under the majority of its CDS 
agreements,” leading to “a run on its collateral by its derivative counterparties and CDS 
protection buyers”); Stephen J. Lubben, Repeal the Safe Harbors, 18 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 
319, 320 (2010) (describing the AIG collapse as a “downward spiral”). MBS are promissory notes 
backed by interests in mortgage loans and thus not themselves derivatives. See FIRST EMPIRE 
SEC., MORTGAGE BACKED SECURITIES, http://www.1empire.com/Forms/MBS.pdf [https://
perma.cc/63SV-M8FR]. 
 11.  See, e.g., Michael S. Barr & Joe Valenti, Commentary: How the CFPB Fight Is a Sign of 
the Next Financial Crisis, FORTUNE (Dec. 6, 2017, 4:16 PM), https://fortune.com/2017/12/06/cfpb-
director-mick-mulvaney-leandra-english [https://perma.cc/MD42-H59F].  
 12.  Letter from Warren E. Buffet, Chairman of the Board, Berkshire Hathaway Inc., to the 
Shareholders, Berkshire Hathaway Inc. (Feb. 21, 2003), in BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC., 2002 
ANNUAL REPORT 15 (2003), https://www.berkshirehathaway.com/2002ar/2002ar.pdf [https://
perma.cc/A5WK-D5FL]. The media has also suggested that Lehman Brothers’ derivatives 
contracts were unusually systemically risky. See, e.g., Jeffrey McCracken, Lehman’s Chaotic 
Bankruptcy Filing Destroyed Billions in Value, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 29, 2008, 12:01 AM), https://
www.wsj.com/articles/SB123050916770038267 [https://perma.cc/9S6X-P2GB] (reporting that the 
early termination of Lehman Brothers’ derivatives contracts is estimated to have cost the firm 
approximately $50 billion).  
 13.  See Stout, supra note 2, at 33 (“[T]he Congress that enacted Dodd-Frank clearly 
recognized that the OTC derivatives market had played a critical, if poorly understood, role in 
causing the [financial] crisis.”). 
 14.  See Lynch, supra note 5, at 11–12 (arguing that the standard definition of a derivative is 
“both over- and under-inclusive,” thereby “hamper[ing] our ability to differentiate between 
socially useful and socially harmful derivatives” and “prolong[ing] the use of an outdated 
derivatives regulatory scheme”).  
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counterparties,15 it is uncertain whether that requirement actually 
reduces, or inadvertently concentrates and increases, systemic risk.16 
Furthermore, derivatives regulation does not always adequately 
address credit-default swap (“CDS”) derivatives, which this Article 
shows to be the most systemically risky type of derivatives.17 
This Article deconstructs derivatives into two categories of 
traditional legal instruments18—option contracts and guarantees—
which correspond to the derivatives’ economic functions.19 Being 
neither exotic nor uniquely risky, most derivatives should be minimally 
regulated like those traditional instruments.20 However, at least one 
subset of guarantees—namely, guarantees of financial obligations 
(“financial guarantees”) with large and highly interconnected financial 
institutions as counterparties (“systemically important counter-
parties”21)—can seriously threaten economic stability. CDS derivatives 
epitomize this subset. As a result, derivatives regulation should target 
the threat these specific derivatives pose. 
 
 15.  See infra notes 127–33 and accompanying text. Such clearing and settling is called central 
clearing; it usually occurs through a well-capitalized entity associated with a derivatives, 
commodities, or other securities exchange. Andrew Bloomenthal, Central Counterparty Clearing 
House (CCP), INVESTOPEDIA (Aug. 5, 2019), https://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/ccph.asp 
[https://perma.cc/MA3W-G7UY].  
 16.  See infra notes 148–49 and accompanying text. 
 17.  See infra Parts IV.B & IV.C (discussing credit-default swaps as the most systemically 
risky type of derivative). 
 18.  This Article uses the term “instrument” in accordance with standard legal usage to mean 
any “legal document that defines rights, duties, entitlements, or liabilities.” Instrument, BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). 
 19.  See Robert C. Merton & Zvi Bodie, A Conceptual Framework for Analyzing the 
Financial Environment, in THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM: A FUNCTIONAL PERSPECTIVE 3–4 
(Dwight B. Crane et al. eds., 1995) (viewing finance from a “functional perspective” by focusing 
on the underlying economic functions); Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Financial Change: A 
Functional Approach, 100 MINN. L. REV. 1441, 1444 (2016) (“In thinking about regulating a 
dynamically changing financial system, it may be more effective . . . to focus on the system’s 
underlying, and thus less time-dependent, economic functions than to tie regulation to any specific 
financial architecture.”).  
 20.  For example, neither loan agreements, option contracts, nor guarantees are generally 
regulated. The author is aware of only two types of restrictions on sophisticated parties entering 
into traditional legal instruments: restrictions on charging usurious rates of interest, see, e.g., Ann 
K. Wooster, Construction and Application of Usury Provisions in State Constitutions, 73 A.L.R. 
6TH 571, 571 (2012) (listing and discussing usury laws in different states), and restrictions on 
margin lending as set forth in Federal Reserve Regulations G, 12 C.F.R. §§ 207.1–207.11 (2020); 
T, §§ 220.1–220.132; U, §§ 221.1–221.125; and X, §§ 224.1–224.3. 
 21.  This definition of systemically important counterparties should at least be deemed to 
encompass firms that are designated by the federal government as systemically important 
financial institutions (“SIFIs”). See infra note 218 and accompanying text.  
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The Article proceeds as follows. Part I deconstructs derivatives 
into option contracts and guarantees. It also demonstrates that most 
derivatives are not inherently riskier than those traditional legal 
instruments. Part II analyzes what can make a derivative risky. It shows 
that, as financial guarantees, CDS contracts can threaten economic 
stability when they have one or more systemically important 
counterparties and that the absence of an insurable-interest 
requirement22 can further magnify that threat. Part III critiques 
existing derivatives regulation, arguing that such regulation often starts 
from the flawed premise that most derivatives are uniquely risky. 
Additionally, it shows that derivatives regulation that starts from that 
flawed premise—including aspects of the Group of Twenty (“G20”) 
nations’ regulatory scheme for derivatives,23 which is followed by the 
United States24—is also flawed. Part IV argues that derivatives 
regulation should target CDS contracts that can threaten economic 
stability. It also analyzes how to design that regulation. The Appendix 
proposes model language for its implementation. 
The Article’s analysis focuses on derivatives counterparties that 
are sophisticated and understand their contracts. The extent to which 
regulators should impose “suitability” or similar requirements on less 
sophisticated or knowledgeable derivatives counterparties is beyond 
this Article’s scope.25 
 
 22.  This is a requirement that a person taking out insurance must derive some benefit from 
the continued existence of the insured person or property. See infra note 118 and accompanying 
text. 
 23.  The G20 is “a collection of twenty of the world’s largest economies [including the United 
States] formed in 1999” to “bring together the most important industrialized and developing 
economies to discuss international economic and financial stability.” James McBride & Andrew 
Chatzky, The Group of Twenty, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELS. (June 10, 2019), https://
www.cfr.org/backgrounder/group-twenty [https://perma.cc/3XSQ-ND2D]. 
 24.  See Richard Heckinger, Ivana Ruffini & Kirstin Wells, Fed. Rsrv. Bank of Chi., Over-
the-Counter (OTC) Derivatives, in UNDERSTANDING DERIVATIVES: MARKETS AND 
INFRASTRUCTURE ch. 3, at 32 (2014), https://www.chicagofed.org/~/media/publications/
understanding-derivatives/understanding-derivatives-chapter-3-over-the-counter-derivatives-pdf.pdf  
[https://perma.cc/MT7F-M92M]; Over-The-Counter Derivatives, FED. RSRV. BANK OF N.Y., 
https://www.newyorkfed.org/financial-services-and-infrastructure/financial-market-infrastructure- 
and-reform/over-the-counter-derivatives [https://perma.cc/P86F-JJQ8] (observing that the 
United States is implementing the G20-proposed reforms “under the Dodd-Frank [Act] and 
rulemakings by U.S. agencies, including the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, Securities 
and Exchange Commission, as well as prudential regulators including the Federal Reserve”). 
 25.  For discussions of the suitability doctrine and its development under securities laws, see 
Willa E. Gibson, Investors, Look Before You Leap: The Suitability Doctrine Is Not Suitable for 
OTC Derivatives Dealers, 29 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 527, 529 (1998); Lewis D. Lowenfels & Alan R. 
Bromberg, Suitability in Securities Transactions, 54 BUS. LAW. 1557, 1558 (1999); Robert H. 
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I.  DECONSTRUCTING DERIVATIVES 
A proper understanding of derivatives will drive better derivatives 
regulation. Cutting through their mystique, derivatives are simply risk-
shifting contracts between two or more parties.26 That does not make 
them unique; indeed, the purpose of many financial contracts is to shift 
risks.27 Nor does the fact that derivatives derive their value from 
underlying assets28 make them unique; “[i]n reality, the value of every 
asset depends in part on something else.”29 Moreover, derivatives may 
not even be innovative—the “Babylonians used [contracts similar to] 
derivative contracts to bet on the fates of desert trading caravans.”30 
Section A deconstructs derivatives by their economic functions 
into two categories of traditional legal instruments: option contracts 
and guarantees. Thereafter, Section B demonstrates that derivatives 
contracts are not inherently riskier than those traditional instruments. 
A. Functionally, Derivatives Are Option Contracts and Guarantees 
Market participants generally refer to four types of derivatives 
contracts: options, forwards, futures, and swaps.31 An option is a 
contract under which one party has the right to buy an asset from, or 
sell an asset to, another party on or before a future date at a specified 
 
Mundheim, Professional Responsibilities of Broker-Dealers: Suitability Doctrine, 1965 DUKE L.J. 
445, 448. 
 26.  Derivative Financial Markets (Part I): Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Telecomm. & 
Fin. of the H. Comm. on Energy & Com., 103d Cong. 160 (1994) (statement of Alan Greenspan, 
Chairman, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System) (“The economic function of 
[derivatives] is to allow risks that formerly had been combined to be unbundled and transferred 
to those most willing to assume and manage each risk component.”); Saul S. Cohen, The 
Challenge of Derivatives, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 1993, 2005 & n.61 (1995) (“[O]ne should 
understand that derivatives lessen volatility by efficiently shifting risk from parties less able or 
willing to bear it to others with the resources to more readily absorb such risk in exchange for a 
potential profit.”). 
 27.  See, e.g., Adam J. Levitin, Prioritization and Mutualization: Clearinghouses and the 
Redundancy of the Bankruptcy Safe Harbors, 10 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 129, 141 (2015) 
(discussing why many financial contracts shift credit and market risk); Edward J. Janger & John 
A.E. Pottow, Implementing Symmetric Treatment of Financial Contracts in Bankruptcy and Bank 
Resolution, 10 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 155, 155 (2015) (discussing the various functions 
of financial contracts). 
 28.  See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
 29.  Lynch, supra note 5, at 28. 
 30.  Stout, supra note 2, at 11 (citing LAURENT L. JACQUE, GLOBAL DERIVATIVES 
DEBACLES: FROM THEORY TO MALPRACTICE 4 (2010)).  
 31.  See Lynch, supra note 5, at 20 (observing that, in “common parlance, derivatives are 
typically referred to as options, forwards, or swaps (or hybrids of each)” (citations omitted)). 
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price.32 Next, a forward contract is “an agreement between two parties 
(a buyer and a seller) that calls for the delivery of an asset at a future 
point in time [at] a price agreed upon today.”33 Similarly, a futures 
contract is a standardized “type of forward contract that is traded on 
an organized exchange and subject to exchange rules and clearing 
procedures.”34 Finally, a swap is a contract under which “two parties 
agree to exchange (or ‘swap’) at least two identified sets of cash flows” 
on a future date.35  
Although these industry-derived categories describe some of the 
mechanics of derivatives contracts, they do not provide an analytical 
foundation for regulating derivatives. To provide that foundation, this 
Article shows that all derivatives can be deconstructed by their 
economic functions into traditional option contracts and guarantees. 
1. Deconstructing Derivatives into Option Contracts.  One type of 
derivative, an option, maps directly onto the traditional category of 
legal instruments known as option contracts.36 Option contracts are 
contracts that “limit[] the promisor’s power to revoke an offer.”37 They 
are therefore coextensive with option derivatives. For example, an 
option derivative under which one party has the right to buy an asset 
from another party on a future date, at a set price,38 is an option 
contract because the seller of that asset cannot revoke its promise to 
sell on those terms.39 Similarly, an option derivative under which one 
party has the right to sell an asset to another party on a future date, at 
a set price, is an option contract because the buyer of that asset cannot 
revoke its promise to buy on those terms.40  
2. Deconstructing Derivatives into Guarantees.  The International 
Monetary Fund (“IMF”) and the finance literature refer to the three 
 
 32.  DON M. CHANCE & ROBERT BROOKS, INTRODUCTION TO DERIVATIVES AND RISK 
MANAGEMENT 28 (9th ed. 2013).  
 33.  Id. at 258.  
 34.  Lynch, supra note 5, at 20 n.75; see also CHANCE & BROOKS, supra note 32, at 258. 
 35.  Lynch, supra note 5, at 20 n.76. Swaps also could be viewed, economically, as a series of 
forward contracts. CHANCE & BROOKS, supra note 32, at 413. 
 36.  See, e.g., JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CONTRACTS 10 (4th ed. 1998) 
(describing option contracts as a traditional contract category). 
 37.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 25 (AM. L. INST. 1981) (defining an option 
contract). 
 38.  See supra note 32 and accompanying text (defining an option derivative). 
 39.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 87 (AM. L. INST. 1981). 
 40.  See id. 
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remaining types of derivatives—forward contracts, futures contracts, 
and swaps41—as “forward-type contracts.”42 Forward-type contracts 
represent arrangements in which the parties agree to exchange—that 
is, to swap—identified assets (or their market value43) or cash flows at 
a future time. Thus, in a forward contract, the parties agree to deliver 
an asset at a future time in exchange for an agreed price;44 in a futures 
contract, the parties agree on standardized terms to deliver an asset at 
a future time in exchange for an agreed price;45 and in a swap, the 
parties agree to exchange identified cash flows at a future time.46  
Although the term “forward-type contract” streamlines 
derivatives-industry terminology, it does not describe a category of 
traditional legal instruments. Functionally, however, all forward-type 
contracts fit into the traditional category of “guarantees,” which are 
promises or assurances that certain conditions will be fulfilled.47 To 
understand why, consider the most widely used forward-type contracts: 
 
 41.  See supra note 31 and accompanying text. 
 42.  INT’L MONETARY FUND, MONETARY AND FINANCIAL STATISTICS MANUAL AND 
COMPILATION GUIDE para. 4.160 (2017) [hereinafter IMF MANUAL], https://www.imf.org/~/
media/Files/Data/Guides/mfsmcg_merged-web-pdf [https://perma.cc/7WXU-LJT9] (“There are 
two broad types of financial derivatives—options and forward-type contracts.”); id. para. at 4.162 
(“A forward-type contract . . . is an unconditional contract by which two counterparties agree to 
exchange a specified quantity of an underlying item (financial or real) at an agreed-upon contract 
price (the strike price) on a specified date.”). Although the IMF Manual uses the term “financial 
derivatives,” there does not appear to be any material difference between that term and this 
Article’s term “derivatives.” Cf. E-mail from Colleen M. Baker, Assistant Professor of Legal 
Stud., Price Coll. of Bus., Univ. of Oklahoma, to author (Dec. 23, 2019) (on file with author) 
(“Finance literature breaks derivatives into options and forwards.”). 
 43.  See infra notes 48–50 and accompanying text. 
 44.  See supra note 33 and accompanying text.  
 45.  See supra note 34 and accompanying text (observing that futures contracts are simply 
standardized types of forwards). 
 46.  See supra note 35 and accompanying text. 
 47.  See Guarantee, LEXICO, https://www.lexico.com/en/definition/guarantee [https://perma.cc/ 
QP7N-W6WN] (defining a “guarantee” as a “formal promise or assurance (typically in writing) 
that certain conditions will be fulfilled”). This Article uses the spelling “guarantee” rather than 
the much less common “guaranty” spelling. Whereas the latter spelling sometimes refers only to 
a financial guaranty, the former spelling includes, in the author’s experience, all guarantees. But 
cf. E-mail from Pim (W.A.K.) Rank, Professor of Fin. L., Leiden Univ. Faculty of L., to author 
(Feb. 10, 2020) (on file with author) (clarifying that whereas this Article uses the word guarantee 
“to refer both to the situation where a party simply commits itself to fulfill a particular obligation 
and to the situation where a party undertakes to answer for the performance of another person’s 
debt or obligation in the event of a default by the person primarily responsible,” of which a CDS 
is “a typical example,” lawyers in “the Netherlands and many other continental European 
jurisdiction[s] . . . would not use the word guarantee to refer to the first situation”). 
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commodity swaps, interest-rate swaps, and CDS contracts.48 In a typical 
commodity swap, Parties A and B effectively bet on the market value 
of an identified unit of commodity Y at time1 (“t1”) in the future. If 
the market value of that unit at t1 exceeds $X, say by $Δ, the contract 
requires Party A to pay $Δ to Party B. If the market value of that unit 
at t1 is below $X, say by $Φ, the contract requires Party B to pay $Φ to 
Party A.49 The swap functions economically, then, as two guarantees. 
Each party to the transaction guarantees the other party that the 
market value of a unit of commodity Y will not be above or below $X 
at t1, respectively. Unless the value of the unit is $X at t1, one party 
pays the other $Δ or $Φ, according to which guarantee was not met. 
Although parties historically settled these types of derivatives 
contracts by actual delivery of commodities, cash settlements are now 
more common because they are convenient.50 
Similarly, in a typical interest-rate swap, Parties A and B agree to 
exchange a stream of floating interest-rate payments for a stream of 
fixed interest-rate payments, based on an identified principal amount, 
identified interest rates, and a specified time period.51 The party that 
initiates the swap—say Party A—usually is trying to manage the 
exposure created by its obligations to pay a floating interest rate on an 
underlying loan. Party A accomplishes this in a swap by paying a 
 
 48.  See, e.g., Carney Simpson, Note, Do End-Users Get the Best of Both Worlds?—Title VII 
of Dodd–Frank and the End-User Exception, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1759, 1775 (2012) 
(reporting on a 2010 ISDA survey showing that “80% [of derivatives counterparties] use the OTC 
market for interest rate swaps, 59% for currency swaps, 27% for credit default swaps, 25% for 
equity swaps, and 32% for energy/commodity swaps”). Recall that CDS is the acronym for a 
credit-default swap. Justin Kuepper, Credit Default Swap (CDS) Definition, INVESTOPEDIA (Mar. 
20, 2020), https://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/creditdefaultswap.asp [https://perma.cc/ZYK8-
HFFX].  
 49.  For example, assume Parties A and B make their contract in April 2019, that the 
identified unit of commodity Y is one ton of iron ore, that t1 is April 15, 2020, and that $X is $90. 
In April 2019, the market value of a ton of iron ore was approximately $93.70. See Iron Ore Prices 
from May 2019 to May 2020 (in U.S. Dollars per Dry Metric Ton Unit), STATISTA, https://
www.statista.com/statistics/300419/monthly-iron-ore-prices [https://perma.cc/YQ92-RAJS]. In 
mid-April 2020, the market value of a ton of iron ore had fallen to approximately $84.73, see id., 
which is below $90 by $5.27 (that is, $Φ = $5.27). Under the contract, Party B must pay $5.27 to 
Party A. 
 50.  See James Chen, Cash Settlement, INVESTOPEDIA (Apr. 4, 2019), https://
www.investopedia.com/terms/c/cashsettlement.asp [https://perma.cc/2FL5-WUPZ]; cf. MICHAEL 
DURBIN, ALL ABOUT DERIVATIVES 1 (2d ed. 2010) (observing that although “some derivatives 
guarantee something other than a price [like performance of an obligation or even] things like 
temperature or rainfall,” the “vast majority of derivatives are price guarantees”). 
 51.  See, e.g., Justin Kuepper, Interest Rate Swap Definition, INVESTOPEDIA (Feb. 19, 2019), 
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/i/interestrateswap.asp [https://perma.cc/8CF6-L53E]. 
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stream of fixed interest-rate payments to its counterparty, Party B, and 
receiving in exchange the stream of floating interest-rate payments—
which it then uses to pay its lender.52 If the amount of the stream of 
fixed interest-rate payments exceeds the amount of the stream of 
floating interest-rate payments, say by $Δ, Party A would be required 
to pay $Δ to Party B.53 If the amount of the stream of floating interest-
rate payments exceeds the amount of the stream of fixed interest-rate 
payments, say by $Φ, Party B would be required to pay $Φ to Party A. 
Party B would agree to the swap if it believes the stream of fixed 
interest-rate payments it receives from Party A will exceed the stream 
of floating interest-rate payments that it pays to Party A.54 
Economically, an interest-rate swap—just like a commodity 
swap—functions as two guarantees. Party A guarantees Party B that 
the amount of the stream of fixed interest-rate payments exceeds the 
amount of the stream of floating interest-rate payments. Party B 
guarantees Party A that the amount of the stream of floating interest-
rate payments exceeds the amount of the stream of fixed interest-rate 
payments.55  
The last most commonly used forward-type contract, a CDS 
contract, is most transparently a guarantee. Indeed, it is a special type 
called a “financial guarantee.”56 In a typical CDS contract,57 a 
protection or credit “seller” (say Party A) agrees to assume, in 
exchange for a fee, a protection or credit “buyer’s” (say Party B’s) 
credit risk with respect to certain debt obligations owed by a specified 
borrower or other obligor.58 If a “credit event”—for example, default 
or bankruptcy—occurs in respect of that obligor, Party A will either 
pay Party B an amount calculated by reference to the post-default 
 
 52.  See Interest Rate Swaps, PIMCO, https://global.pimco.com/en-gbl/resources/education/
understanding-interest-rate-swaps [https://perma.cc/34UJ-3Y66] (explaining interest-rate swaps 
generally). 
 53.  The actual settlement times for payment depend on the specific contract.  
 54.  Interest Rate Swaps, supra note 52. 
 55.  If the amount of the stream of fixed interest-rate payments exceeds the amount of the 
stream of floating interest-rate payments, say by $Δ, Party A would be required to pay $Δ to Party 
B. If the amount of the stream of floating interest-rate payments exceeds the amount of the stream 
of fixed interest-rate payments, say by $Φ, Party B would be required to pay $Φ to Party A.  
 56.  See infra note 62 and accompanying text. 
 57.  CDS contracts are sometimes referred to as credit derivatives. IMF MANUAL, supra 
note 42, at para. 4.180. References in this Article to CDS contracts and credit derivatives are 
synonymous. 
 58.  STEVEN L. SCHWARCZ, STRUCTURED FINANCE: A GUIDE TO THE PRINCIPLES OF 
ASSET SECURITIZATION § 10:1.1 (Adam D. Ford ed., 3d ed. 2010). 
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value of the debt obligations or buy the debt obligations for their full 
face value from Party B.59  
Although market participants regard CDS contracts as swaps60 
and the “S” in the CDS acronym stands for “swap,” a CDS is not a 
typical swap.61 Rather, it epitomizes a financial guarantee—a 
contractual arrangement in which one party, in exchange for a fee, 
agrees for the benefit of another party to assume credit risk on a debt 
obligation.62 In the author’s experience, market participants sometimes 
characterize a CDS as “a guarantee documented as a derivative” by 
writing the contract on an ISDA form.  
 
 59.  Id. § 10:3.1. For example, assume Party B makes a loan to Party C, and Party B is 
concerned about Party C’s ability to repay the loan. Party B, as protection buyer, may then enter 
into a CDS contract with Party A, as protection seller, under which Party A agrees to make any 
payments that Party C fails to make. In exchange for this protection, Party B pays Party A a fee. 
See, e.g., Credit Default Swaps, PIMCO, https://www.pimco.com/en-us/resources/education/
understanding-credit-default-swaps [https://perma.cc/934H-ZLRZ] (explaining credit-default 
swaps). Protection sellers may enter into many CDS contracts, thereby earning fee income while 
helping market participants to hedge risk.  
 60.  Congress, for example, included in its definition of a “‘swap agreement’ . . . any such 
agreement, contract, or transaction commonly known as an interest rate swap, including a . . . debt 
swap, credit spread, credit default swap, [or] credit swap.” Commodity Futures Modernization 
Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-554, app. E, tit. III, sec. 301(a), § 206A(a), 114 Stat. 2763A-365, 
2763A-449 to -450. 
 61.  Documenting a CDS as a derivatives contract on an ISDA form does not make it a 
traditional swap. In a traditional swap, the counterparties exchange cash flows on underlying 
financial instruments. The business goal is to trade, or swap, the variable cash-flow risks between 
the counterparties. See Policy Statement Concerning Swap Transactions, 54 Fed. Reg. 30,694, 
30,695 (July 21, 1989) (“[A] swap may be characterized as an agreement between two parties to 
exchange a series of cash flows measured by different interest rates, exchange rates, or prices with 
payments calculated by reference to a principal base . . . .”). In a CDS, the guarantee fee is not 
variable but a fixed-payment obligation. See Stout, supra note 2, at 6 (describing CDS 
transactions). But cf. Darrell Duffie, Credit Swap Valuation, 1999 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 73, 73 
(arguing that the “term ‘swap’ applies to credit swaps because they can be viewed, under certain 
ideal conditions . . . , as a swap of a default-free floating-rate note for a defaultable floating-rate 
note”). For an introduction to ISDA’s form documentation, see generally ISDA, LEGAL 
GUIDELINES FOR SMART DERIVATIVES CONTRACTS: THE ISDA MASTER AGREEMENT (Feb. 
2019), https://www.isda.org/a/23iME/Legal-Guidelines-for-Smart-Derivatives-Contracts-ISDA-
Master-Agreement.pdf [https://perma.cc/RN4V-CSVL]. 
 62.  See Guarantee, supra note 47 (providing a legal definition of “guarantee” as a “formal 
pledge to pay another person’s debt or to perform another person’s obligation in the case of 
default”). U.K. law, for example, recognizes a CDS’s essential guarantee function. See, e.g., 
Leonard Ng, Credit Default Swaps, Guarantees and Insurance Policies: Same Effect, Different 
Treatment?, 25 BUTTERWORTHS J. INT’L BANKING & FIN. L. 664, 664–66 (2010) (observing that 
U.K. financial and insurance law treats CDS contracts and guarantees similarly in many important 
respects, in sharp contrast to how that law treats “insurance contracts,” with which they are 
sometimes confused). 
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By their economic functions, derivatives contracts are thus option 
contracts and guarantees.63 This suggests that derivatives contracts, 
inherently, are no riskier than those traditional legal instruments.64 
Section B demonstrates this proposition. 
B. Derivatives Are Not Inherently Riskier than Option  
Contracts and Guarantees 
The widely held perception that derivatives are inherently riskier 
than other financial instruments is based on anecdotal information65 
and has never been rigorously tested. This Section examines and 
corrects this misperception, showing that derivatives are not inherently 
riskier than option contracts and guarantees.66  
Some argue that derivatives are inherently riskier because they are 
bets.67 However, virtually all financial instruments are bets. An option 
contract is a bet on the future price of an asset.68 A guarantee is a bet 
by the guarantor that the guaranteed obligation will not default. Even 
a loan agreement is a bet by a lender that the borrower will repay the 
loan with interest on a timely basis.69 
 
 63.  E-mail from Timothy E. Lynch, Associate Professor of L., UMKC Sch. of L., to author 
(Jan. 2, 2020) (agreeing “that all derivatives can be reduced to options and what [I] call 
guarantees”); see also Norman Menachem Feder, Deconstructing Over-the-Counter Derivatives, 
2002 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 677, 691 (discussing the “limited number of basic building blocks that 
constitute most OTC derivatives products”); Alireza M. Gharagozlou, Unregulable: Why 
Derivatives May Never Be Regulated, 4 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 269, 293–94 (2010) 
(“Derivatives are contracts entered into by willing and informed parties, for the age-old purpose 
of risk allocation. Parties have entered into such arrangements in one form or another for 
millennia.”).  
 64.  Professor Lynch suggests that “even guarantees can be reconstructed as options and vice 
versa.” E-mail from Timothy E. Lynch, supra note 63. Even if some (or all) of what this Article 
calls guarantees can be reconstructed that way, all derivatives would still fall within this Article’s 
categories of option contracts and guarantees—namely, traditional financial instruments. 
 65.  Cf. supra notes 8–12 and accompanying text (discussing Warren Buffet’s description of 
derivatives as financial weapons of mass destruction and the media’s portrayal of AIG’s 
derivatives problems as a poster child for the financial crisis). 
 66.  This discussion in Section B is adapted from Steven L. Schwarcz, Central Clearing of 
Financial Contracts: Theory and Regulatory Implications, 167 U. PA. L. REV. 1327, 1336–39 (2019) 
[hereinafter Schwarcz, Central Clearing of Financial Contracts]. 
 67.  See, e.g., Stout, supra note 2, at 6 (characterizing derivatives contracts as bets, given that 
they are “agreements between parties that one will pay the other a sum of money that is 
determined by whether or not a particular event occurs in the future”). 
 68.  See supra note 32 and accompanying text (observing that an option contract gives one 
party the right to buy an asset from, or to sell an asset to, another party at a specified price in the 
future). 
 69.  See Schwarcz, Central Clearing of Financial Contracts, supra note 66, at 1336. 
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Others argue that derivatives are inherently riskier than other 
financial instruments because they are much more volatile given that 
“[u]nlike other contracts, the value of [derivatives contracts] typically 
can change rapidly based on the fluctuating value of the underlying 
assets or collateral, prevailing market conditions and other factors.”70 
That volatility, the argument goes, can create the possibility of 
indeterminate liability. Consider, for example, an interest-rate swap in 
which Party A exchanges its fixed interest-rate payments for Party B’s 
floating-rate payments. If interest rates fall, the argument goes, Party 
A will take a loss that cannot be precisely quantified ex ante because it 
will depend on the magnitude of the interest-rate change. 
That argument fails to recognize, however, that derivatives 
counterparties usually can estimate the limits of their potential 
liability.71 In the foregoing example, there is indeterminate liability 
insofar as the parties cannot know the sign, positive or negative, and 
magnitude of the interest-rate change at the time they enter into the 
derivatives contract. In reality, however, they will know from market 
experience and data modeling the likely maximum range of any 
interest-rate change within the timeframe of their contractual 
settlement date.72 Thus, if Party A contracts to sell one thousand shares 
of XYZ stock to Party B a year hence at seventy dollars per share, its 
current market value, then there is indeterminate liability insofar as the 
parties cannot currently know how the sign and magnitude of XYZ 
stock’s market value will change. In reality, counterparties minimize 
this indeterminacy by again relying on market experience and their 
ability to calculate the likely maximum range of XYZ stock’s change 
within the next year.73  
 
 70.  Exploring Chapter 11 Reform: Corporate and Financial Institution Insolvencies; 
Treatment of Derivatives: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Regul. Reform, Com. & Antitrust L. 
of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 40 (2014) (statement of Seth Grosshandler, 
Partner, Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP). 
 71.  See, e.g., René M. Stulz, Should We Fear Derivatives?, 18 J. ECON. PERSP. 173, 186 (2004) 
(observing that, “[s]ince 1994, regular users of derivatives have made considerable progress in 
measuring the risks of derivatives portfolios [and w]ith these tools, firms that use derivatives 
regularly know their risks reasonably well,” but cautioning that “these measurement tools do not 
always work well”).  
 72.  See, e.g., PAUL G. FERRARA & SEYED ALI NEZZAMODDINI, INTEREST RATE SWAPS – 
AN EXPOSURE ANALYSIS 26 (2013), https://www.soa.org/globalassets/assets/files/research/
projects/research-2013-interest-rate-swaps.pdf [https://perma.cc/7D7Z-KGUQ] (discussing how 
parties estimate their likely exposure to interest-rate change within the timeframe of their 
contractual settlement date). 
 73.  See, e.g., infra note 76 and accompanying text (observing that accountants have devised 
a range of methodologies to estimate potential liability for even the most complex derivatives). 
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Although the foregoing examples are relatively simple, 
counterparties usually can estimate the limits of their potential liability 
even for much more complex derivatives. In the United States, the 
disclosure of this liability is an accounting requirement; derivatives are 
to be measured at fair value and reported as either assets or liabilities.74 
The goal is to ensure parties provide the “credible, transparent, and 
comparable financial information” that undergirds “the efficient 
functioning of the economy.”75 To facilitate this required disclosure, 
accountants have devised a range of methodologies to estimate 
potential liability for even the most complex derivatives.76  
In short, derivatives are not inherently riskier than the option 
contracts and guarantees they functionally represent.77  
 
 74.  3 ACCT. STANDARDS CODIFICATION § 815-10-10 (FIN. ACCT. STANDARDS BD. 2020). 
The standards set by the Financial Accounting Standards Board are recognized by the SEC as 
“‘generally accepted’ for purposes of the federal securities laws.” Commission Statement of Policy 
Reaffirming the Status of the FASB as a Designated Private-Sector Standard Setter, Securities 
Act Release No. 8221, Exchange Act Release No. 47,743, Investment Company Act Release No. 
26,028, 68 Fed. Reg. 23,333 (May 1, 2003). 
 75.  FIN. ACCT. STANDARDS BD., FACTS ABOUT FASB 1 (2007), https://www.fasb.org/cs/
BlobServer?blobcol=urldata&blobtable=MungoBlobs&blobkey=id&blobwhere=1175818791156 
&blobheader=application%2Fpdf [https://perma.cc/ZS7T-U3HQ].  
 76.  See, e.g., ERNST & YOUNG, CREDIT VALUATION ADJUSTMENTS FOR DERIVATIVE 
CONTRACTS 1, 5–6 (2014), https://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/EY-credit-valuation-
adjustments-for-derivative-contracts/$FILE/EY-Applying-FV-April-2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/
S8CK-LQSH]. This publication discusses various approaches for calculating valuation 
adjustments to value derivatives contracts “at fair value.” Id. Fair value, in this context, is defined 
by International Financial Reporting Standards (“IFRS”) 13 as “the price that would be . . . paid 
to transfer a liability in an orderly transaction between market participants at the measurement 
date,” INT’L FIN. REPORTING STANDARDS FOUND., IFRS 13: Fair Value Measurement, in IFRS 
STANDARDS, at A669, A673 (2020), http://eifrs.ifrs.org/eifrs/bnstandards/en/IFRS13.pdf [https://
perma.cc/LRS4-WF7E]. The Deloitte accounting firm defines fair value under IFRS 13 more 
intuitively as “how much the reporting entity has to pay to a market participant such that the 
market participant is willing to take over the liability.” DELOITTE LLP, CLEARLY IFRS: 
SUMMARY GUIDANCE AND PRACTICAL TIPS FOR IFRS 13 – FAIR VALUE MEASUREMENT 1 
(2014), https://www.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/ca/Documents/audit/ca-en-audit-clearly-
ifrs-fair-value-measurement-ifrs-13.pdf [https://perma.cc/NJC9-XUAK]. The “most advanced 
approach” is the Expected Future Exposure (“EFE”) approach, which is used by banks and other 
financial institutions with large derivative portfolios and can be “used for many types of 
derivatives.” ERNST & YOUNG, CREDIT VALUATION ADJUSTMENTS FOR DERIVATIVE 
CONTRACTS, supra, at 5–6. Because the EFE approach “can be very complex and . . . needs to be 
executed by quantitative experts and requires access to significant IT systems,” many firms “have 
adopted alternative approaches for estimating” liability on their derivatives contracts. Id. 
 77.  See Feder, supra note 63, at 721 (“[M]any of the risks that are common to most OTC 
derivatives are common to other financial instruments as well.”). 
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II.  ANALYZING DERIVATIVES RISK 
Although derivatives are not inherently riskier than option 
contracts and guarantees, there is little doubt that derivatives 
sometimes create very significant risk. This Part first argues that CDS 
contracts, which constitute financial guarantees, can be exceptionally 
risky. Thereafter, it argues that CDS contracts that have one or more 
systemically important counterparties can become systemically risky 
and that the absence of an insurable-interest requirement can further 
magnify that risk.  
A. Financial Guarantees, and Thus CDS Contracts, Can Be 
Exceptionally Risky 
For at least four reasons, financial guarantees are riskier than 
other types of guarantees: they ensure against unpredictable future 
events, in contrast with non-financial guarantees; they are subject to 
more economy-wide risks; they overrely on quantitative modeling and 
thus are more subject to bias;78 and they guarantee instruments that can 
become correlated. 
First, financial guarantees ensure against unpredictable future 
events. All guarantees are risky, of course, because they ensure future 
events. Non-financial guarantees, though, normally ensure reasonably 
predictable events. Consider typical property-and-casualty and life 
insurance, for instance, which comprises the great bulk of non-financial 
guarantees. Traditionally, insurance companies will not insure events 
absent rigorous statistical and actuarial data.79 Financial obligations, in 
contrast, tend to be sui generis and harder to predict. For example, 
decades of residential mortgage-loan data did not predict the 
unprecedented 2007–2009 housing-price decline, which was greater 
than during the Great Depression. Even the rating agencies failed to 
 
 78.  For a discussion of the impact of biases, see generally Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating 
Financial Guarantors: Abstraction Bias as a Cause of Excessive Risk-Taking, 11 HARV. BUS. L. 
REV. (forthcoming 2021) [hereinafter Schwarcz, Regulating Financial Guarantors], https://
ssrn.com/abstract=3431345 [https://perma.cc/K5ZG-L3BD]. 
 79.  See, e.g., CHARLES NYCE, AM. INST. FOR CHARTERED PROP. CAS. UNDERWRITERS/
INS. INST. AM., PREDICTIVE ANALYTICS WHITE PAPER 2 (2007), http://www.the-digital-
insurer.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/78-Predictive-Modeling-White-Paper.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
KS2T-3ELB] (demonstrating insurance companies’ use of predictive analytics and explaining that 
proprietary data, as well as data from “numerous third party sources,” allow insurance companies 
to develop predictive models by which to determine premiums). 
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predict that decline.80 Moreover, there are “no standardized 
agreements or controls that exist” for over-the-counter debt 
securities.81  
Second, financial guarantees are also subject to greater 
uncertainty than other guarantees because they are more exposed to 
“systematic,”82 economy-wide risks. Non-financial guarantees are less 
susceptible to economy-wide risks because a guarantor can better 
diversify its coverage. In property-and-casualty life insurance, for 
example, insurers normally can diversify their risks sufficiently to 
accurately estimate their future losses, enabling them to price their 
insurance accordingly.83 A financial guarantor, however, cannot easily 
diversify its coverage because most, if not all, financial obligations are 
affected systematically—that is, in the same orderly way—by economy-
wide risks such as interest rate changes, inflation, recessions, and war.84  
Third, in light of the foregoing uncertainties, financial guarantors 
are prone to overrely on quantitative models, which provide a 
(sometimes unjustified) sense of comfort.85 These models, in turn, can 
 
 80.  See, e.g., CORELOGIC, EVALUATING THE HOUSING MARKET SINCE THE GREAT 
RECESSION 4 (2018) (noting S&P’s precrisis model that housing prices could fall as much as 20 
percent, whereas they actually fell around 33 percent—more than their fall in the Great 
Depression); cf. Adam J. Levitin & Susan M. Wachter, Explaining the Housing Bubble, 100 GEO. 
L. J., 1177, 1234 (2012) (discussing the failure of rating agencies to provide reliable ratings on 
MBS because of the securities’ lack of “multicycle experience” and the variety of “collateral, 
borrower strength, and credit enhancements” across deals, none of which are alike). 
 81.  Protiviti KnowledgeLeader, What is Financial Instrument Risk?, KNOWLEDGELEADER 
(Jan. 25, 2018, 5:13 PM), https://info.knowledgeleader.com/financial-instrument-risk [https://
perma.cc/G3S6-4CPV]. 
 82.  Systematic risk means “risk that cannot be diversified away and therefore affects most, 
if not all, market participants.” Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, supra note 9, at 204. Systematic risk is 
different than systemic risk, which refers to risk that could undermine the ability of the financial 
system to function as a network. Id. 
 83.  See, e.g., Viral V. Acharya, John Biggs, Hanh Le, Matthew Richardson & Stephen Ryan, 
Systemic Risk and the Regulation of Insurance Companies, in REGULATING WALL STREET: THE 
DODD-FRANK ACT AND THE NEW ARCHITECT OF GLOBAL FINANCE 241 (Viral V. Acharya, 
Thomas F. Cooley, Matthew Richardson & Ingo Walter eds., 2011) (“In competitive markets, 
insurers price diversifiable risks on an actuarial basis, yielding tremendous utility gains to the 
previously exposed individuals and businesses.”).  
 84.  See id. at 253 (noting that nontraditional insurance activities are more exposed to 
macroeconomic variables); Matthew C. Turk, The Convergence of Insurance with Banking and 
Securities Industries, and the Limits of Regulatory Arbitrage in Finance, 2015 COLUM. BUS. L. 
REV. 967, 989–99 (discussing the convergence of traditional insurance and finance). 
 85.  See, e.g., Raphaële Chappe, Edward Nell & Willi Semmler, The Financial Crisis of 2008 
as Cognitive Failure: An Overview of Risk over Uncertainty, 57 BERKELEY J. SOCIO. 9, 23 (2013) 
(discussing problems with the mathematical models that were used precrisis for MBS risk 
management and arguing that by unreliably predicting the magnitude and frequency of rare 
events, they allowed investors to “get lulled with a false sense of security”).  
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foster cognitive biases—implicit simplifications of how one perceives 
reality.86 For example, optimism bias can cause financial guarantors to 
believe they can quantify unquantifiable risks.87 While parties to any 
financial contract may be subject to optimism bias,88 financial 
guarantors are also subject to another important cognitive bias. 
Because they do not actually transfer their property at the time they 
make a guarantee, financial guarantors may view their risk-taking 
more abstractly than, say, a lender that advances its own funds to a 
borrower.89 This “abstraction bias” causes financial guarantors to 
underestimate the risk,90 even after discounting for the fact that 
payment on a guarantee is a contingent obligation.91 Empirical findings 
confirm that abstraction bias is real and that it can influence even 
sophisticated financial guarantors.92 
Fourth, the instruments underlying financial guarantees can 
become correlated. And as they become correlated, so do the risks on 
the guarantees. This occurred, for example, when home-mortgage-loan 
obligations became correlated during the financial crisis.93 Lenders 
believed that repayment of those obligations was diversified by the 
variation in regional housing prices, not recognizing that nationally all 
housing prices were overvalued. In 2007, housing prices throughout the 
 
 86.  Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Complacency: Human Limitations and Legal Efficacy, 
93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1073, 1079 (2018). 
 87.  See Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: The Problem 
of Market Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 630, 661 (1999) (“When the pertinent events are not 
easily predictable and the feedback is not unambiguous, experts tend to be even more 
overconfident than laypersons.”). 
 88.  Iman Anabtawi & Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Systemic Risk: Towards an Analytical 
Framework, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1349, 1366 (2011) [hereinafter Anabtawi & Schwarcz, 
Regulating Systemic Risk].  
 89.  Schwarcz, Regulating Financial Guarantors, supra note 78 (manuscript at 5). 
 90.  Id.  
 91.  Posit, for example, that a firm is deciding between two options: to lend $1 million to a 
borrower for a year with 3 percent interest and a 0.5 percent chance of the borrower defaulting 
on payment; or to guarantee a one-year $1 million loan made by another lender to the same 
borrower (and thus with the same 0.5 percent chance of default), for a guarantee fee having the 
same economic value. Although the expected value of these options to the firm would be 
equivalent, abstraction bias would cause the firm to view the guarantee option less seriously. Id. 
(manuscript at 5 n.23). 
 92.  See generally id. (comparing the pricing of otherwise parallel risk-taking by financial 
firms that invest capital at the outset of securitization transactions and by financial guarantors of 
those transactions, and finding that the initial investors demand substantially higher pricing than 
the financial guarantors for taking the same amount of risk). 
 93.  See, e.g., INT’L MONETARY FUND, GLOBAL FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT 5–20 
(2008), https://www.imf.org/~/media/Websites/IMF/imported-full-text-pdf/external/pubs/ft/gfsr/
2008/02/pdf/_text.ashx [https://perma.cc/8UPX-66LH].  
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country dropped precipitously, and borrowers generally began 
defaulting on their mortgage loans.94 It often is difficult to foresee these 
correlations.95 Furthermore, the degree of loss on a guarantee of a 
financial obligation can be up to the full amount of that obligation.96 
The risk analysis on guarantees might not always take that degree of 
loss into account.97  
The failure rate of financial guarantors confirms these risks. 
Consider the example of insurance companies that guarantee the 
payment of principal and interest to investors on bonds and other debt 
securities.98 Of the nine such insurers operating prior to the financial 
crisis, all but one failed—a failure rate much higher than that of 
banks.99  
CDS contracts fit within the category of financial guarantees.100 It 
therefore is no surprise that scholars have labeled them as “the 
derivative instrument most implicated in the recent financial crisis”101 
 
 94.  Steven L. Schwarcz, Keynote Address, Understanding the Subprime Financial Crisis, 60 
S.C. L. REV. 549, 550–52 (2009).  
 95.  See, e.g., Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Complexity in Financial Markets, 87 WASH. U. 
L. REV. 211, 223–24 (2009) [hereinafter Schwarcz, Regulating Complexity in Financial Markets]; 
see also infra notes 193–95 and accompanying text (illustrating why it often is difficult to anticipate 
correlations in advance and why hidden correlations are only observable when there is full 
appreciation of the underlying variables). 
 96.  Robert C. Merton & Zvi Bodie, On the Management of Financial Guarantees, 21 FIN. 
MGMT. 87, 91 (1992) (“The guarantor firm bears the full downside risk as if it were the owner of 
the collateral assets.”); see also PRUDENTIAL FIN., INC., 2014 ANNUAL REPORT 206 (2015), http:/
/www3.prudential.com/annualreport/report2015/annual/images/Prudential-AR2014.pdf [https://
perma.cc/X6TL-Y2NT] (“The Company’s maximum amount at risk under [its] credit derivatives 
equals the aforementioned notional amounts [i.e., principal and accrued interest on the 
underlying obligations on which Prudential sold credit protection] and assumes the value of the 
underlying referenced securities [i.e., their principal and interest payable thereunder] become[s] 
worthless.”). 
 97.  See generally Merton & Bodie, supra note 96 (describing risk-management methods for 
financial guarantors and the methods’ associated difficulties). 
 98.  See, e.g., D. Dulani Jayasuriya, Icarus of the 21st Century: The Rise and Fall of 
Monoline/Bond Insurers 2 (Jan. 18, 2019) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/
abstract=3318631 [https://perma.cc/P6N2-XGMT]. 
 99.  Id. at 19–26. Data from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”) show that 
twenty-five banks failed in 2008, 140 failed in 2009, and 157 failed in 2010. Quarterly Banking 
Profile, 5 FDIC Q., no. 4, 2011, at 5 tbl.I-A, https://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/quarterly/2011-
vol5-4/fdic-quarterly-vol5no4.pdf [https://perma.cc/AES8-P3XD]. For the years of 2008, 2009, 
and 2010, there were 8305, 8012, and 7658 banks reporting to the FDIC, respectively, for failure 
rates of 0.3 percent, 1.7 percent, and 2.1 percent, respectively. Id. 
 100.  See supra notes 61–63 and accompanying text (discussing why CDS contracts epitomize 
financial guarantees). 
 101.  See, e.g., Sean J. Griffith, Substituted Compliance and Systemic Risk: How To Make a 
Global Market in Derivatives Regulation, 98 MINN. L. REV. 1291, 1299 (2014); see also Michael 
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as well as the riskiest type of derivatives contract.102 AIG’s near 
failure,103 for example, resulted from defaults under CDS contracts.104 
More recently, JP Morgan Chase lost $6 billion betting on the strength 
of CDS instruments.105  
B. Having One or More Systemically Important Counterparties Can 
Magnify CDS Risk 
Financial-guarantee risk is magnified when the guarantee contract 
has one or more systemically important counterparties. And, notably, 
CDS contracts often have at least one such counterparty.106 This 
magnifies the risk because systemically important counterparties tend 
 
Greenberger, Too Big To Fail U.S. Banks’ Regulatory Alchemy: Converting an Obscure Agency 
Footnote into an “At Will” Nullification of Dodd-Frank’s Regulation of the Multi-Trillion Dollar 
Financial Swaps Market 29–30 (Inst. for New Econ. Thinking, Working Paper No. 74, 2018), 
https://www.ineteconomics.org/uploads/papers/WP_74.pdf [https://perma.cc/NBP3-7FKQ] 
(arguing that “CDS (especially ‘naked’ CDS) fomented” the financial crisis, and citing 
“economists, regulators, investigating commissions, market observers, and financial columnists” 
who agree that CDS “played” a “central role” in that crisis (footnotes omitted)). 
 102.  Yesha Yadav, The Problematic Case of Clearinghouses in Complex Markets, 101 GEO. 
L.J. 387, 391 (2013). 
 103.  See supra notes 10–11 and accompanying text (discussing the use of derivatives by AIG 
and its near failure). 
 104.  See, e.g., Lubben, supra note 10, at 320 (observing that CDS investors commenced 
collection actions against AIG because of the collapse of the MBS market, which threatened 
AIG’s financial integrity).  
 105.  JPMorgan Chase Whale Trades: A Case History of Derivatives Risks and Abuses: 
Hearing Before the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations of the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & 
Governmental Affs., 113th Cong. 4 (2013) (statement of Sen. Carl Levin). The bank’s London 
desk executed a series of complicated trades that would profit if corporate bond indexes rose, 
with the intention of hedging itself from the risk of default on the loans it held on its books. See 
Daniel Wilchins & Carrick Mollenkamp, JPMorgan’s Future Losses at the Mercy of an Obscure 
Index, REUTERS (May 17, 2012, 12:21 AM), https://reut.rs/JPOPkZ [https://perma.cc/F557-
3LQK]. One index, the Markit CDX NA IG Series 9, maturing in 2017, was a portfolio of CDS 
contracts. Id. That index tracked the credit quality of 121 high-quality bond issuers, including 
Kraft Foods and Walmart. Id. When JP Morgan’s trades started losing money, many other traders 
began taking the opposite position. They hoped to profit from JPMorgan’s loss, thus 
compounding it. Id.  
 106.  See Christopher S. Dwight, Note, Missed (Inter)Connections: Proposed Revisions to the 
Federal Reserve’s Approach to Financial Stability Analysis Under the Bank Holding Company Act, 
18 N.C. BANKING INST. 599, 603 (2014) (arguing that derivatives counterparties often engage in 
multiple transactions with systemically important firms); Franklin R. Edwards & Edward R. 
Morrison, Derivatives and Systemic Risk: What Role Can the Bankruptcy Code Play?, in SYSTEMIC 
FINANCIAL CRISES: RESOLVING LARGE BANK INSOLVENCIES 347, 351 (Douglas D. Evanoff & 
George G. Kaufman eds., 2005) (finding that relatively few banks control the derivatives market 
and that seven U.S. banks hold more than 95 percent of the U.S. national derivatives exposure). 
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to do business with like counterparties,107 creating an 
interconnectedness that drives systemic risk.108 The failure of a 
systemically important counterparty can lead to a domino effect, 
triggering a chain of failures.109  
The U.S. government bailed out AIG, a systemically important 
protection seller on multiple CDS contracts, to prevent such a domino 
effect.110 The failure of Lehman Brothers, another systemically 
important firm, is widely believed to have precipitated the financial 
crisis.111 Consistent with these observations, economists at the New 
York Federal Reserve Bank and finance scholars at Yale contend that 
a derivatives contract can “create[] systemic risk” when a default 
“seriously impair[s] the financial condition of one or more of its 
[systemically important] counterparties.”112  
 
 107.  See, e.g., Mila Getmansky, Giulio Girardi & Craig Lewis, Interconnectedness in the CDS 
Market, 72 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 62, 76–78 (2016) (“Overall, the interconnectedness of the CDS 
market is largely attributable to end users that transact with a relatively small number of dealers, 
who then manage net exposures by trading among themselves.”).  
 108.  See Steven L. Schwarcz, Derivatives and Collateral: Balancing Remedies and Systemic 
Risk, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 699, 704 [hereinafter Schwarcz, Derivatives and Collateral]; see also 
Getmansky, Girardi & Lewis, supra note 107, at 76–79 (“The picture that emerges is one of a 
network that is relatively robust to the disappearance of a random node but potentially vulnerable 
if a few highly connected dealers should fail.”). This interconnectedness creates risk regardless of 
the position of a systemically important counterparty: if a protection seller, the counterparty 
might fail—like AIG—because it cannot make the payments; if a protection buyer, the 
counterparty might fail because it will not get paid. 
 109.  James Bullard, President & Chief Exec. Officer of Fed. Rsrv. Bank of St. Louis, Systemic 
Risk and the Macroeconomy: An Attempt at Perspective (Oct. 2, 2008), https://www.stlouisfed.org/
from-the-president/speeches-and-presentations/2008/systemic-risk-and-the-macroeconomy-an-
attempt-at-perspective [https://perma.cc/JDD3-RJBM]. But see Paul Glasserman & H. Peyton 
Young, Contagion in Financial Networks, 54 J. ECON. LITERATURE 779, 826 (2016) (reviewing 
literature on financial contagion and concluding that more research is needed to understand how 
risks are transmitted); Rizwaan Jameel Mokal, Liquidity, Systemic Risk, and the Bankruptcy 
Treatment of Financial Contracts, 10 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 15, 15–16 (2015) (arguing 
that counterparty failure may not be a significant source of systemic risk, and that the “‘domino’ 
contagion view of distress . . . is theoretically flawed and empirically false”). 
 110.  William K. Sjostrom Jr., The AIG Bailout, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 943, 977–79 (2009). 
 111.  See, e.g., Viral Acharya, Thomas Philippon, Matthew Richardson & Nouriel Roubini, 
The Financial Crisis of 2007-2009: Causes and Remedies, 18 FIN. MKTS. INSTS. & INSTRUMENTS 
89, 93 (2009) (stating that Lehman’s bankruptcy “led to the near collapse of the financial system”); 
Laurence Ball, The Fed and Lehman Brothers: Introduction and Summary 7–8 (Nat’l Bureau of 
Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 22410, 2016), https://www.nber.org/papers/w22410.pdf [https://
perma.cc/VCA6-AZS7] (discussing Lehman’s collapse).  
 112.  Rosalind Z. Wiggins & Andrew Metrick, The Lehman Brothers Bankruptcy G: The 
Special Case of Derivatives, 1 YALE J. FIN. CRISIS 151, 167 (2019) (quoting with approval a New 
York Federal Reserve study). 
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C. The Absence of an Insurable-Interest Requirement Can Further 
Magnify CDS Risk 
Currently, a CDS protection buyer or seller is not required to have 
an “insurable interest” in the financial obligation for which it buys or 
sells protection.113 A CDS contract for which the protection buyer lacks 
such an insurable interest is often called a “naked” CDS.114 Naked CDS 
contracts have heightened risk for two related reasons. First, in theory, 
they can be used purely for speculation,115 which is thought to magnify 
risk by creating an unlimited multiplier effect:  
 
 113.  CHRISTOPHER L. CULP, ANDRIA VAN DER MERWE & BETTINA J. STÄRKLE, CREDIT 
DEFAULT SWAPS 144–45 (2018); see also Stout, supra note 2, at 6 (making the same observation). 
Likewise, there currently is no legal requirement that a beneficiary of a guarantee have an 
insurable interest in the financial obligation that is guaranteed. See, e.g., Stout, supra note 2, at 21 
(describing the enactment of the Commodities Futures Modernization Act of 2000, which 
provided the “wholesale removal of centuries-old restraints on off-exchange derivatives 
speculation”). 
 114.  See, e.g., Gretchen Morgenson, Naked Came the Speculators, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 17, 
2008), https://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/10/business/10gret.html [https://perma.cc/DEQ2-
ADC6]. This Article avoids computational details in defining what constitutes a naked CDS. An 
actual CDS contract might only partially protect an insurable interest. See 111 CONG. REC. 3944 
(2010) (proposal of Sen. Byron Dorgan) (proposing an amendment to the Restoring American 
Financial Stability Act to ban naked CDS transactions and distinguishing between CDS and 
naked CDS contracts on the basis of two criteria: whether the protection buyer owned valid credit 
instruments that matched the CDS’s reference entity, and whether the value of the protection 
buyer’s credit instruments was equal to or greater than the notional amount of the CDS). Without 
precisely comparing the value of the protection buyer’s insurable interest to the amount of CDS 
protection purchased, this author’s visceral reaction is that value that is reasonably equivalent to 
that amount should avoid being naked. See infra note 118 and accompanying text (observing that 
the insurable-interest requirement merely dictates that an insured derive a benefit from the 
continued existence of the insured entity). Clearly, for example, one thousand dollars of CDS 
protection sold to an owner of one hundred dollars of bonds should be naked CDS protection—
at least to the extent of nine hundred dollars of the CDS contract. Cf. Lynch, supra note 5, at 76–
77 (observing that it “is possible—and, indeed, common—for a counterparty to a single 
derivatives contract to be both hedging a pre-existing risk and speculating simultaneously”).  
 115.  See, e.g., Sheri Markose, Simone Giansante & Ali Rais Shaghaghi, ‘Too Interconnected 
To Fail’ Financial Network of US CDS Market: Topological Fragility and Systemic Risk, 83 J. 
ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 627, 631 (2012) (“The so-called naked CDS buy position is, therefore, a 
speculative one undertaken for pecuniary gain from either the cash settlement in the event of a 
default or a chance to offset the CDS purchase with a sale at an improved CDS spread.”). 
However, even a naked CDS contract can be viewed as a traditional guarantee because 
guarantees, unlike insurance contracts, do not need to have an “insurable interest” to be valid. 
See supra note 113; cf. Stout, supra note 2, at 4 (observing that, prior to the twentieth century, the 
common law applied a doctrine called “the rule against difference contracts” to discourage 
derivatives that did not serve a hedging purpose by treating them as unenforceable wagers). But 
see Stout, supra note 2, at 14 (“Despite judicial concern about the negative economic impacts of 
gambling, the common law did not prohibit parties who wanted to wager through speculative 
derivative contracts from doing so.”). 
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[B]etting on market events can create new risk that is an order of 
magnitude larger than the risk associated with the underlying market 
phenomenon. A highly confident derivatives speculator, for example, 
might happily sell $1,000,000 in CDS contracts on a $100,000 bond.116 
Second, naked CDS contracts also are thought to magnify risk by 
fostering moral hazard.117 At common law, there is an insurable-
interest requirement mandating that a person who takes out insurance 
must derive some benefit from the continued existence of the insured 
person or property.118 This requirement helps reduce moral hazard by 
decreasing the incentive for the person taking out the insurance to kill 
the insured person or destroy the insured property in order to collect 
on the insurance policy.119   
Without such a requirement, naked CDS contracts are susceptible 
to similar dangers. Professor Timothy Lynch argues, for example, that 
purely speculative derivatives “increase[] the opportunities to engage 
in societally injurious regulatory arbitrage and may create moral 
hazards and conflicts of interest for corporate executives and corporate 
creditors.”120 Industry observer Nathaniel Dutt argues that a naked 
CDS “will reduce an incentive to monitor or accurately appraise 
 
 116.  Stout, supra note 2, at 10.  
 117.  Charles W. Murdock, The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 
Act: What Caused the Financial Crisis and Will Dodd-Frank Prevent Future Crises?, 64 SMU L. 
REV. 1243, 1319–20 (2011); cf. Jerome A. Madden, A Weapon of Mass Destruction Strikes: Credit 
Default Swaps Bring Down AIG and Lehman Brothers, 5 AM. U. BUS. L. BRIEF 15, 20 (2008) 
(arguing that at least some of AIG’s use of CDS contracts included naked CDS contracts).  
 118.  Alexander Charap, Minimizing Risks, Maximizing Flexibility: A New Approach to 
Credit Default Swap Regulation, 11 J. BUS. & SEC. L. 127, 156 (2011) (“The insurable interest 
requirement is a common law doctrine which dictates that an insured must derive a benefit, 
financial or otherwise, from the continued existence of the insured entity. Absent an insurable 
interest, an insurance contract may be void.”). 
 119.  Id. at 157; Lynch, supra note 5, at 49 (“The primary reason for implementing the 
insurable interest rule is that without it, an undesirable moral hazard may be created. A non-
hedging policyholder would have incentive to murder an insured person or destroy insured 
property.”). The problem of moral hazard is that “persons protected from the negative 
consequences of their risky actions will be tempted to take more risks.” Steven L. Schwarcz, Too 
Big To Fool: Moral Hazard, Bailouts, and Corporate Responsibility, 102 MINN. L. REV. 761, 761 
(2017) [hereinafter Schwarcz, Too Big To Fool]. 
 120.  Timothy E. Lynch, Gambling by Another Name; The Challenge of Purely Speculative 
Derivatives, 17 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 67, 74 (2011) [hereinafter Lynch, Gambling by Another 
Name]. But compare Stout, supra note 2, at 10 (arguing that speculative derivatives trading is a 
zero-sum game that exposes both parties to “new risks without providing any compensating 
increase in aggregate returns”), with MICHAEL S. BARR, HOWELL E. JACKSON & MARGARET E. 
TAHYAR, FINANCIAL REGULATION: LAW AND POLICY 1165 (2d ed. 2018) (observing that any 
“derivative’s payoff structure is normally zero-sum”).  
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certain risks.”121 For example, he suggests that “a bank that makes 
loans and then purchases a CDS to reduce the risk of a borrower 
default will have a reduced incentive to monitor the loans.”122 Although 
the CDS protection seller would thereby gain that incentive, he argues 
that the “bank is in the best position to” engage in that monitoring.123  
In summary, derivatives are not inherently riskier than the 
traditional option contracts and guarantees they functionally 
represent. However, at least one subset of guarantees—CDS contracts 
with systemically important counterparties—can seriously threaten 
economic stability, and their speculative nature and the absence of an 
insurable-interest requirement can further magnify that threat.  
III.  DERIVATIVES REGULATION IS OFTEN FLAWED 
By starting from the flawed premise that most derivatives are 
uniquely risky, the consequent derivatives regulation is also often 
flawed. Section A shows that derivatives regulation often starts from 
this flawed premise, and Section B shows that such derivatives 
regulation, which includes aspects of the G20 regulatory scheme (and 
thus U.S. law, which follows that scheme124), can simultaneously 
overregulate and underregulate derivatives in ways that can 
inadvertently concentrate systemic risk. 
A. Derivatives Regulation Often Presumes that Most Derivatives Are 
Uniquely Risky 
By following the G20 regulatory scheme,125 U.S. derivatives 
regulation has shifted “from a laissez-faire paradigm to a bank 
regulatory paradigm focused on safety and soundness.”126 To ensure 
safety and soundness, U.S. law requires most derivatives, often 
 
 121. Nathaniel G.  Dutt, Current United States Credit Default Swap Regulatory Initiatives: A 
New World Standard of Just a Ploy, 16 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 169, 184 (2009). 
 122.  Id. It is questionable, however, whether that example represents naked CDS if the bank 
is buying CDS protection on a loan it still owns. 
 123.  Id. 
 124.  See supra notes 23–24 and accompanying text.  
 125.  See supra notes 23–24 and accompanying text (introducing the G20 and its regulatory 
scheme for derivatives). 
 126.  Arthur W.S. Duff & David Zaring, New Paradigms and Familiar Tools in the New 
Derivatives Regulation, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 677, 678 (2013).  
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regardless of their type127 and contractual counterparties,128 to be 
cleared129 and settled130 through central counterparties (“CCPs”).131 
 
 127.  Compare supra note 31 and accompanying text (observing that market participants 
recognize four types of derivatives contracts), with Paul M. McBride, The Dodd-Frank Act and 
OTC Derivatives: The Impact of Mandatory Central Clearing on the Global OTC Derivatives 
Market, 44 INT’L L. 1077, 1102 (2010) (arguing that “[b]y expansively defining the terms Swap and 
Security-Based Swap to include most options and swap transactions, along with any agreement 
that subsequently becomes commonly known as a swap,” the Dodd-Frank Act “ensures that the 
clearing requirements are broadly applicable and capture the different types of derivative 
products that currently exist or that may arise in the future”).  
 128.  The Financial Stability Board suggests that regulators should consider exempting 
derivatives without systemically important counterparties from central clearing requirements:  
The impact of an entity on financial stability from OTC derivatives is likely to depend 
on the extent of their activity. Lower levels of OTC derivatives activity, all else equal, 
are likely to result in a lower impact. Thus, while the financial stability benefits from 
central clearing by [counterparties with lower levels of derivatives activity] can still 
exist, the gains are likely to be smaller than those for entities in the systemic core, 
particularly relative to the costs . . . . [Standard setting bodies therefore] may merit 
consideration . . . of [not imposing the central clearing] reforms on market participants 
that are not considered systemically important. 
FIN. STABILITY BD., INCENTIVES TO CENTRALLY CLEAR OVER-THE-COUNTER (OTC) 
DERIVATIVES 4 (2018) [hereinafter FIN. STABILITY BD., INCENTIVES TO CENTRALLY CLEAR], 
https://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/R191118-1-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/2F2B-5R4C]; see also 
Schwarcz, Derivatives and Collateral, supra note 108, at 712 (“Incongruously, the [U.S. 
bankruptcy law] safe harbor [for derivatives] operates independently of the size of the 
counterparty or its portfolio. . . . By failing to take systemic importance into account, the safe 
harbor extends well beyond its purported rationale of reducing systemic risk.”). 
 129.  Clearing is “the process of transmitting, reconciling and, in some cases, confirming 
transfer orders prior to settlement.” EUR. CENT. BANK, GLOSSARY OF TERMS RELATED TO 
PAYMENT, CLEARING AND SETTLEMENT SYSTEMS 5 (2009), https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/
other/glossaryrelatedtopaymentclearingandsettlementsystemsen.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q2YK-
9EQV]. It involves identifying the obligations of the parties to the transaction. See id. 
 130.  Settlement is “the completion of a transaction or of processing with the aim of 
discharging participants’ obligations through the transfer of funds and/or securities.” Id. at 24. 
 131.  See, e.g., Derivatives, SEC, https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/dodd-frank/derivatives.shtml 
[https://perma.cc/6J52-XYRC] (explaining that Title VII of the Dodd-Frank Act and followup 
regulation by the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) and Commodities Futures 
Trading Commission (“CFTC”), require that most derivatives contracts be centrally cleared 
through CCPs). 
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CCPs are well-capitalized entities132 often associated with derivatives, 
commodities, or other securities exchanges.133  
The goal of this central clearing requirement, which applies only 
to derivatives, is to reduce counterparty risk.134 By legally substituting 
its credit for that of the contracting parties, the CCP becomes the 
primary counterparty on both sides of the derivatives contract—for 
example, the buyer to every seller and the seller to every buyer.135 
Central clearing thereby reduces individual counterparty risk136 by 
ensuring the performance of a derivatives contract even if a contracting 
party fails.137  
Like the United States, many other countries follow the G20 
regulatory scheme to require the central clearing of derivatives, often 
regardless of their type.138 As of mid-October 2019, for example, 
 
 132.  Schwarcz, Central Clearing of Financial Contracts, supra note 66, at 1329, 1358. But see 
Colleen M. Baker, Regulating the Invisible: The Case of Over-the-Counter Derivatives, 85 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1287, 1291–94 (2010) (arguing that CCPs should be even better capitalized); Paolo 
Saguato, The Ownership of Clearinghouses: When “Skin in the Game” Is Not Enough, the 
Remutualization of Clearinghouses, 34 YALE J. ON REG. 601, 604 (2017) (discussing the agency 
costs and risks associated with different ownership models for CCPs); Paolo Saguato, The 
Unfinished Business of Regulating Clearinghouses, 2020 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 55–64 (offering 
policy solutions to strengthen CCPs’ resilience). 
 133.  The three largest U.S. CCPs, for example, are CME Clearing Services, which provides 
clearing and settlement of exchange trades on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange and the Chicago 
Board of Trade; ICE Clear U.S., which is owned by New York Stock Exchange parent company 
Intercontinental Exchange; and LCH, which is a unit of the London Stock Exchange Group. See 
Clearing Firms, CME GRP., https://www.cmegroup.com/clearing/financial-and-regulatory-
surveillance/clearing-firms.html [https://perma.cc/TPY2-2TBE] (providing a list of clearing 
firms); Michelle Price, Three Biggest U.S. Clearing Houses Pass Liquidity Stress Tests: CFTC, 
REUTERS (Oct. 16, 2017, 12:08 AM), https://reut.rs/2idTBEd [https://perma.cc/6PJJ-A9SJ] 
(naming CME Clearing, ICE Clear U.S., and LCH Ltd as the three largest U.S. clearing houses).  
 134.  Schwarcz, Central Clearing of Financial Contracts, supra note 66, at 1330; cf. Duff & 
Zaring, supra note 126, at 702 (discussing the federal regulatory mandate to assure the “safety 
and soundness” of derivatives, regardless of their type).  
 135.  See, e.g., PETER NORMAN, THE RISK CONTROLLERS 7 (2011) (“By becoming the buyer 
to every seller and the seller to every buyer, the CCP assures completion of the trade if a trading 
partner defaults.”); Richard Squire, Clearinghouses as Liquidity Partitioning, 99 CORNELL L. 
REV. 857, 862 (2014) (“The clearinghouse interposes itself between the parties, serving as the 
counterparty to each. Instead of selling the cattle future to Buyer, Seller sells it to the 
clearinghouse, which sells an identical future to Buyer.”). The substitution of credit is legally 
referred to as a “novation,” which arises when a new party assumes a payment obligation that was 
incurred by a debtor on a contract and the original debtor is totally released from the obligation. 
66 C.J.S. Novation § 1 (2020).  
 136.  Counterparty risk is the risk that a contracting party’s default will harm other parties to 
the contract. NORMAN, supra note 135, at 9. 
 137.  Id. at 7. 
 138.  See generally Heckinger et al., supra note 24 (summarizing the regulatory history of the 
central clearing mandate for derivatives contracts). 
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“[e]ighteen jurisdictions have in force comprehensive 
standards/criteria for determining when standardised OTC derivatives 
should be centrally cleared . . . .”139 “Standardized” derivatives include 
virtually all derivatives that are “documented on ISDA forms.”140 That 
is a “very low bar” because derivatives commonly are documented on 
those forms.141  
U.S. and foreign derivatives regulation that follows the G20 
regulatory scheme thus requires most derivatives, but no other type of 
financial instrument, to be centrally cleared to reduce their risk. 
Effectively, therefore, that regulation treats most derivatives as 
uniquely risky.  
B. Derivatives Regulation that Starts from that Flawed Premise Is 
Also Flawed 
The flawed premise that most derivatives are uniquely risky has 
given rise to “a derivatives regulatory regime that often appears 
confusing, incomplete, contradictory, greatly subject to interpretation, 
incapable of addressing derivatives innovation, and even at times, 
simply irrational or incomprehensible.”142 Existing regulation not only 
overregulates derivatives in some ways and underregulates them in 
others but also concentrates—and thereby, inadvertently may 
increase—systemic risk.  
The central clearing requirement, for example, overregulates 
derivatives because it applies to most derivatives, often regardless of 
their type or their counterparties.143 Existing regulation also 
underregulates derivatives by inadequately addressing what this 
Article later describes as systemically risky CDS contracts.144 
 
 139.  FIN. STABILITY BD., OTC DERIVATIVES MARKET REFORMS: 2019 PROGRESS REPORT 
ON IMPLEMENTATION 2 (2019), https://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/P151019.pdf [https://
perma.cc/JB8Z-MAR8] (“In a few of these 18 jurisdictions a wider range of products is now 
subject to mandatory clearing.”).  
 140.  Schwarcz, Central Clearing of Financial Contracts, supra note 66, at 1372. 
 141.  Id. 
 142.  Lynch, supra note 5, at 13. 
 143.  See supra notes 127–28 and accompanying text.  
 144.  See infra Parts IV.B & IV.C; see also FIN. STABILITY BD., REVIEW OF OTC 
DERIVATIVES MARKET REFORMS EFFECTIVENESS AND BROADER EFFECTS OF THE REFORMS 
§ 3.2.1, at 12 (2017), https://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/P290617-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/
V44W-6D7D] (reporting that the rate of central clearing has increased more for interest-rate 
derivatives than for CDS contracts and estimating the global rate of CDS central clearing was 
only 28 percent at end-December 2016, although that represents a sharp increase from 5 percent 
at end-June 2009). But see Houman B. Shadab, Counterparty Regulation and its Limits: The 
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Recognizing that CDS derivatives were the type most responsible for 
causing the financial crisis, several governmental organizations 
contemplated specifically regulating the CDS market.145 Ironically, the 
faulty perception that most derivatives are uniquely risky diverted 
regulatory attention from CDS contracts alone to derivatives 
generally.146  
Although intended to reduce risk,147 central clearing could 
inadvertently increase systemic risk by “shift[ing] counterparty risk” 
from individual counterparties to the CCP, thereby concentrating the 
risk.148 Even the Financial Stability Board, the G20 body that originally 
proposed the central clearing requirement, is becoming concerned that 
central clearing might increase, rather than reduce, systemic risk.149 
The G20 regulatory scheme also proposes minimum margin 
requirements for non-centrally cleared derivatives.150 “Posting margin” 
 
Evolution of the Credit Default Swaps Market, 54 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 689, 705 (2010) (arguing 
that CDS risk-management practices have always been “generally adequate,” and that “the 
broader infrastructure of the CDS market [has always] remained generally stable” except for “the 
very small portion of the market whereby an unregulated subsidiary or affiliate of an insurance 
company [presumably referring to AIG] sold too much CDS protection referencing certain 
banking institutions’ mortgage-backed CDOs”). 
 145.  See Thomas Lee Hazen, Filling a Regulatory Gap: It Is Time To Regulate Over-the-
Counter Derivatives, 13 N.C. BANKING INST. 123, 124 (2009) (discussing efforts by the SEC and 
the President’s Working Group on the financial crisis to centralize the CDS market and plans, 
later dropped, by New York State to regulate CDS contracts as insurance). 
 146.  See, e.g., Kristin N. Johnson, Things Fall Apart: Regulating the Credit Default Swap 
Commons, 82 U. COLO. L. REV. 167, 235–41 (2011) (describing the Dodd-Frank Act’s wide 
regulatory ambit that reaches not only CDS derivatives but the OTC derivatives market as a 
whole). 
 147.  See supra notes 135–37 and accompanying text. 
 148.  Anabtawi & Schwarcz, Regulating Systemic Risk, supra note 88, at 1395; see also Mark 
J. Roe, Clearinghouse Overconfidence, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 1641, 1692 n.123, 1697 (2013) 
(collecting sources on whether central clearing reduces or merely shifts counterparty risk from 
individual counterparties to the CCPs); Ivana Ruffini, Central Clearing: Risks and Customer 
Protections, 39 ECON. PERSP. 90, 97 (2015) (observing that central clearing creates systemic costs 
by concentrating counterparty risk in the CCPs); Yadav, supra note 102, at 389 (challenging the 
“regulatory and academic consensus” by arguing  “that clearinghouses, as presently conceived,  
are sorely ill-equipped to contend with the complex legal and economic risks of the credit 
derivative”).   
 149.  See FIN. STABILITY BD., INCENTIVES TO CENTRALLY CLEAR, supra note 128, at 3 
(observing that “[s]urvey responses and market outreach are also consistent with a view that 
concentration in clearing service provision could amplify the consequences of the failure” of a 
“major” derivatives counterparty). Economists also argue that the central clearing of CDS 
transactions could reduce netting efficiency if done separately. Darrell Duffie & Haoxiang Zhu, 
Does a Central Clearing Counterparty Reduce Counterparty Risk?, 1 REV. ASSET PRICING STUD. 
74, 90 (2011). 
 150.  Over-The-Counter Derivatives, supra note 24. 
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refers to providing securities or other liquid assets as collateral to 
secure a counterparty’s obligation to settle a derivatives contract. For 
example, a CDS protection seller that would be obligated to pay $1 
million if the CDS contract were settled on that day might, if the 
contract so provided, be required to provide the protection buyer with 
(at least) $1 million of securities to collateralize that obligation. 
Presuming that most derivatives are uniquely risky, minimum margin 
requirements are supposed to ensure that derivatives counterparties 
who are unprotected by central clearing at least are adequately 
protected by collateral.151 Margin requirements, however, can be a 
mixed blessing. Although they can help to protect against counterparty 
default,152 margin requirements also can lead to unpredictable 
liquidity-funding demands if the counterparty lacks sufficient liquid 
assets to post.153 Indeed, AIG’s near failure resulted from its inability 
to satisfy CDS margin requirements.154  
More significantly, it is dubious whether regulators should impose 
formulaic155 margin requirements on sophisticated derivatives 
counterparties who presumably know best how to control their own 
risk and have incentives to do so.156 Those counterparties can, and 
 
 151.  See, e.g., BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION & BD. OF THE INT’L ORG. OF SEC. 
COMM’NS, MARGIN REQUIREMENTS FOR NON-CENTRALLY CLEARED DERIVATIVES 3 (2015) 
[hereinafter BASEL COMM. ET AL., MARGIN REQUIREMENTS], https://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/
d317.pdf [https://perma.cc/GY8A-3GYN]; COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N & SEC, 
JOINT REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL SWAP REGULATION 25 (2012), https://www.sec.gov/news/
studies/2012/sec-cftc-intlswapreg.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZK5Q-KA54].  
 152.  See Schwarcz, Regulating Complexity in Financial Markets, supra note 95, at 232–33 
(discussing how margin requirements can help to protect against counterparty default). 
 153.  Id.; see also Diana Milanesi, Risk/Benefit Analysis of Central Clearing of Over-the-
Counter (OTC) Derivatives and a Chaos Theory-Based Perspective on Clearing Mandates 197 
(Summer 2017) (Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Berkeley), https://escholarship.org/
content/qt8nz4n9z9/qt8nz4n9z9.pdf [https://perma.cc/F6N5-HS6P]; Craig Pirrong, The 
Inefficiency of Clearing Mandates, CATO INST. 3 (July 21, 2010), https://object.cato.org/sites/
cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/PA665.pdf [https://perma.cc/3CEZ-UDKH] (observing that “imposing 
margin requirements” can limit risk but is “socially costly”). 
 154.  See supra note 10. But cf. Patrick Fitzgerald & Marie Beaudette, Lehman Wasn’t Felled 
by JP Morgan Collateral Calls, WALL ST. J. (May 17, 2012, 2:46 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/
SB10001424052702303360504577410353589465814 [https://perma.cc/59N7-7VYQ] (reporting the 
Treasury Secretary’s position that “the government takeover of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in 
the days before Lehman’s Sept. 15, 2008, Chapter 11 filing resulted in institutional investors and 
clearing banks ‘pulling away’ from financial institutions, including Lehman, and was the real 
reason that the investment bank entered a death spiral”). 
 155.  For instructions on how to calculate these margin requirements, see 17 C.F.R. § 23.154 
(2020). 
 156.  Although sophisticated derivatives counterparties may know “best,” they do not 
necessarily know perfectly. 
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normally do, balance their own costs and benefits when contracting 
about their rights and obligations to post margin.157 In this regard, the 
G20’s minimum margin requirements for non-centrally cleared 
derivatives parallel the G20’s questionable risk-retention, or “skin-in-
the-game,” requirements for securitization transactions.158 Those 
securitization requirements either overlook, or ignore, that it was 
always common practice for sponsors of securitizations to retain 
substantial risk on the underlying loans they sold.159 Indeed, other 
securitization counterparties demanded the sponsors do so, as a matter 
of commercial reality, to protect themselves.160 Thus, the real-world 
impact of the G20’s risk-retention requirements may well be de 
minimis, at best.161  
At worst, however, the false appearance of a regulatory “solution” 
can be dangerous.162 The risk-retention requirement might give the 
appearance of solving the problem of securitization’s abuses, but it 
 
 157.  See, e.g., INT’L SWAPS AND DERIVATIVES ASS’N, LEGAL GUIDELINES FOR SMART 
DERIVATIVES CONTRACTS: COLLATERAL 15 (2019), https://www.isda.org/a/VTkTE/Legal-
Guidelines-for-Smart-Derivatives-Contracts-Collateral.pdf [https://perma.cc/M2UL-GFDP] 
(stating that “[p]arties may wish to exchange collateral even where there is no obligation under 
any relevant regulatory regime to do so,” and providing documentation for parties to do so). In 
theory, one might conceive counterparty A demanding less collateral than socially optimal from 
counterparty B because counterparty A would be unconcerned about externalities if it ends up 
failing due to counterparty B’s default. See infra note 172 and accompanying text. In practice, 
though, any such collateral deficiency should be de minimis, if not zero, because counterparty A 
commonly would demand, and counterparty B commonly would grant, sufficient collateral to 
ensure payment if counterparty B defaults. See Awrey, Split Derivatives, supra note 5, at 500 
(discussing how derivatives counterparties use collateral to help protect themselves).  
 158.  See, e.g., Andrew M. Faulkner, Despite Challenges, Risk Retention Rules Set To Impact 
All Asset-Backed Securities by End of 2016, SKADDEN ARPS SLATE MEAGHER & FLOM LLP 
(Apr. 26, 2016), https://www.skadden.com/insights/publications/2016/04/despite-challenges-risk-
retention-rules-set-to-imp [https://perma.cc/52QC-QJJ5]. The risk-retention requirements were 
mandated by a G20 summit in September 2009. See G20 Leaders Statement: The Pittsburgh Summit, 
TRINITY COLL. UNIV. TORONTO (2019), http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2009/2009communique0925.html 
[https://perma.cc/W4M7-GNT3].  
 159.  See Ryan Bubb & Prasad Krishnamurthy, Regulating Against Bubbles: How Mortgage 
Regulation Can Keep Main Street and Wall Street Safe—from Themselves, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 1539, 
1589–93 (2015) (disputing the notion that risk-retention requirements created moral hazard and 
thus contributed to the financial crisis of 2007–2008). 
 160.  Id. 
 161.  Mathew C. Turk, Securitization Reform after the Crisis: Regulation by Rulemaking or by 
Settlement?, 37 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 861, 880, 901 (2018). 
 162.  See Steven L. Schwarcz, Securitization: Ten Years After the Financial Crisis, 37 REV. 
BANKING & FIN. L. 757, 762 (2018) (observing that risk retention inadvertently can mislead 
securitization investors into thinking they are buying something that is safer than it actually is). 
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does not provide a real solution.163 As this Article argues,164 regulatory 
solutions to the derivatives problem are likely very different than 
imposing artificial margin requirements on sophisticated 
counterparties. 
Part IV next analyzes how to design more targeted and effective 
derivatives regulation. Imperfect as the G20 scheme may be, replacing 
it is politically unrealistic. Therefore, this Article designs targeted 
derivatives regulation to complement and enhance the G20 scheme. 
This follows the well-respected approach of building normative legal 
improvements onto an established positive law foundation.165  
IV.  DESIGNING TARGETED DERIVATIVES REGULATION 
Targeted derivatives regulation should focus on regulating CDS 
contracts with systemically important counterparties (hereinafter, 
“systemically risky CDS contracts”), which can seriously threaten 
economic stability.166 Designing such regulation requires a normative 
framework suitable for regulating financial instruments. Section A 
builds that framework. Section B then uses it to analyze how to 
regulate systemically risky CDS contracts that guarantee insurable 
interests. Thereafter, Section C uses the same framework to analyze 
how to regulate naked systemically risky CDS contracts—namely, 
those that do not guarantee insurable interests.167 Recognizing that 
even the best regulation cannot eliminate CDS risk, Section D 
examines how to regulate the failures that inevitably will occur. Finally, 
the Appendix to this Article proposes model language to implement 
these regulatory recommendations.  
A. Building a Normative Framework for Financial Regulation 
Cost-benefit analysis provides a standard justification for financial 
regulation—the benefits of the proposed regulation should be 
 
 163.  See id. at 760–69 (examining how to fix securitization’s abuses and rebuild confidence). 
 164.  See infra Part IV (analyzing how to design targeted derivatives regulation). 
 165.  See, e.g., Steven L. Schwarcz, Empowering the Poor: Turning De Facto Rights into 
Collateralized Credit, 95 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 7 n.32 (2019).  
 166.  See supra Part II.B. CDS contracts that lack any systemically important counterparties 
should be regulated like ordinary financial guarantees. However, financial guarantee risk is 
magnified when the guarantee contract has one or more systemically important counterparties. 
Id.  
 167.  See supra note 114 and accompanying text (defining naked CDS contracts as those for 
which the protection buyer lacks an insurable interest). 
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expected to exceed its costs.168 This presents a puzzle, though, when 
applied to sophisticated financial firms that engage in derivatives 
transactions generally, much less systemically risky CDS transactions. 
Those firms presumably know best how to control their own risk. They 
also have incentives to control risk to protect their investors. If those 
firms govern themselves accordingly, regulation appears to be 
unjustified because it would not provide any net benefits. Perhaps for 
these reasons, bank regulation—which likewise involves sophisticated 
financial firms that know how, and have incentives, to control risk—
“rarely mandates a specific way [for banks] to mitigate risk, [that is,] 
whether to take out insurance or to take assets as collateral etc.”169 
However, recognizing that the essential purpose of financial 
regulation is to correct market failures can solve this puzzle.170 
Sophisticated financial firms that perfectly control their risk-taking to 
protect investors still might harm other parties, including customers, 
contractors, and even members of the public.171 This third-party harm 
represents a market failure, known as an externality.172  
Corporate governance law does not normally require firms to 
control these.173 Instead, regulation and tort law customarily are used 
to control material externalities. For example, government deposit 
insurance is commonly thought to distort a deposit-taking bank’s risk-
 
 168.  See, e.g., Eric A. Posner & E. Glen Weyl, Benefit-Cost Paradigms in Financial 
Regulation, 43 J. LEG. STUD. 1, 3 (2014) (arguing that financial regulation should be subject to 
cost-benefit analysis); Cass R. Sunstein, Financial Regulation and Cost-Benefit Analysis, 124 
YALE L.J. F. 263, 263 (2015) (“Cost-benefit analysis is best understood as a way for agencies to 
ensure that their decisions are informed.”); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Analysis and 
the Environment, 115 ETHICS 351, 354 (2005) (defending the use of cost-benefit analysis for 
environmental regulation).  
 169.  Schwarcz, Central Clearing of Financial Contracts, supra note 66, at 1363 & n.197 (citing 
Peter O. Mülbert, Managing Risk in the Financial System, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
FINANCIAL REGULATION 365, 395 (Niamh Moloney, Eilís Ferran & Jennifer Payne eds., 2015)). 
 170.  Id. at 1363 & n.198 (first citing DAVID GOWLAND, THE REGULATION OF FINANCIAL 
MARKETS IN THE 1990S, at 21 (1990); then citing PAUL A. SAMUELSON & WILLIAM D. 
NORDHAUS, ECONOMICS 756 (15th ed. 1995)).  
 171.  Steven L. Schwarcz, Misalignment: Corporate Risk-Taking and Public Duty, 92 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1, 4–5 (2016) [hereinafter Schwarcz, Misalignment]. 
 172.  Although economists often categorize externalities as a type of market failure, 
externalities more precisely are caused by market failures—in this case, risk-taking that causes 
uninternalized externalities. Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Shadows: Financial Regulation and 
Responsibility Failure, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1781, 1799–1800 (2013). 
 173.  Under the norm of shareholder primacy, firm managers should act in the interests of 
their investors. This author has questioned whether strict shareholder primacy should apply to 
the governance of systemically important firms, or whether managers of those firms should have 
some form of a public governance duty, see generally Schwarcz, Misalignment, supra note 171. 
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taking because, if the bank fails as a result of risk-taking, much of the 
cost of its failure would be externalized onto the government and 
taxpayers.174 To help correct that distortion and control externalities, 
regulators commonly impose capital requirements on banks.175  
This same regulatory framework can inform the regulation of 
systemically risky CDS contracts. The law does not purport to—nor 
should it—regulate all risky contracting. Absent paternalism, which is 
inappropriate to protect the (mostly) sophisticated parties to 
systemically risky CDS contracts, the purpose of regulating those CDS 
contracts should be to control material externalities. Even with 
sophisticated financial firms as counterparties, systemically risky CDS 
contracts could cause such externalities—a systemically important 
protection seller’s default leading to its failure, or a protection seller’s 
default causing a systemically important protection buyer’s failure, 
could cause a financial collapse that harms the real economy.176 
Regulation that helps to control these externalities is justified, then, if 
its benefits can be expected to exceed its costs.177  
B. Regulating Systemically Risky CDS Contracts that Guarantee 
Insurable Interests 
Next, this Section considers possible regulatory approaches, 
including their costs and benefits, to help control the material 
externalities caused by systemically risky CDS contracts, particularly 
those contracts that guarantee insurable interests. As a threshold 
observation, the size of the CDS market appears to justify appropriate 
 
 174.  See, e.g., Schwarcz, Central Clearing of Financial Contracts, supra note 66, at 1363 & 
n.200 (noting “that ‘[a] financial safety net constituted by deposit insurance’ can lead to market 
failure because ‘[i]n good times, bank shareholders do well, while in extremely bad times the 
insurance fund bails out the bank’s depositors and debtholders’” (alterations in original) (quoting 
Robert L. Hetzel, Should Increased Regulation of Bank Risk-Taking Come from Regulators or 
from the Market?, 95 ECON. Q. 161, 166 (2009))).  
 175.  Id. at 1363 & n.201 (highlighting scholarship determining “that bank capital regulation 
is necessary ‘to reduce the negative externalities resulting from government-imposed deposit 
insurance’” (quoting George J. Benston & George G. Kaufman, The Appropriate Role of Bank 
Regulation, 106 ECON. J. 688, 688, 694–96 (1996))). 
 176.  See supra notes 10–11, 108–12 and accompanying text (discussing the near failure of AIG 
and the consequences of a systemically important firm’s failure). 
 177.  See supra note 168 and accompanying text. Cost-benefit analysis effectively constitutes 
a Kaldor-Hicks efficiency analysis—in this Article’s case, that the aggregate benefit to the 
contracting parties exceeds the aggregate harm. Steven L. Schwarcz, Rethinking Freedom of 
Contract: A Bankruptcy Paradigm, 77 TEX. L. REV. 515, 551–52, 561 (1999). Kaldor-Hicks is the 
real-world operating definition of efficiency. Id. at 560–61 (citing RICHARD A. POSNER, 
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 1.2, at 13–14 (5th ed. 1998)).  
SCHWARCZ IN  PRINTER FINAL IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 11/16/2020  7:38 PM 
578  DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 70:545 
regulation. Although CDS contracts constitute only a fraction of 
derivatives contracts, their notional amount is in the tens of trillions of 
dollars.178 Sections B.1–B.3 examine innovative regulatory approaches. 
Section B.4 then reexamines the G20 regulatory scheme’s approaches.  
1. Limiting Credit Exposure.  Limiting the credit exposure of 
systemically important firms on systemically risky CDS contracts could 
help control externalities by reducing the likelihood that such a firm 
would become unable to pay its CDS obligations, leading to its default 
and failure. One type of credit-exposure limit—a “protection seller 
limit”—could restrict a systemically important protection seller’s 
“correlated” CDS liabilities to an aggregate amount it could feasibly 
pay.179 A protection seller limit would control externalities by avoiding 
a default that causes the protection seller’s failure.180 Such a limit has 
precedent, for example, in U.S. regulation imposing credit limits on 
financial guarantees represented by standby letters of credit.181 
Another type of credit-exposure limit—a “protection buyer 
limit”—could restrict the amount of aggregate protection a 
systemically important firm could buy from “correlated” CDS 
protection sellers to an amount that would enable the firm to continue 
operating without being paid.182 A protection buyer limit would control 
externalities because a protection seller’s default would not thereby 
 
 178.  BIS Statistics: Charts, BIS Q. REV., Mar. 2017 annex at A1, A16, https://www.bis.org/
publ/qtrpdf/r_qt1703.pdf [https://perma.cc/29W8-A498]. The notional amount generally does not 
reflect the amount at risk on a derivative; it merely refers to the value of underlying assets 
specified in the derivatives contract. See, e.g., APANARD (PENNY) PRABHA, KEITH SAVARD & 
HEATHER WICKRAMARACHI, MILKEN INST., DERIVING THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF 
DERIVATIVES 27 (2014), https://assets1b.milkeninstitute.org/assets/Publication/ResearchReport/
PDF/Derivatives-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/5CKQ-ANDS] (“[N]otional amounts outstanding, 
though a rough measure of derivatives activity, do not represent . . . generally, the amount at 
risk.” (citations omitted)). Because CDS contracts guarantee debt obligations, their notional 
amount is the principal plus the accrued interest outstanding on those obligations. See supra note 
96.  
 179.  See infra notes 192–95 and accompanying text (analyzing correlated CDS liabilities). 
 180.  See supra text accompanying note 176 (observing that the failure of a systemically 
important firm can cause material externalities). 
 181.  See, e.g., Boris Kozolchyk, The Emerging Law of Standby Letters of Credit and Bank 
Guarantees, 24 ARIZ. L. REV. 319, 332–33 (1982). Banks also must report at least the amounts of 
their outstanding standby letters of credit on their financial statements. 12 C.F.R. § 337.2(d) 
(2020). 
 182.  See infra notes 196–99 and accompanying text (analyzing correlated CDS protection 
sellers). 
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trigger the protection buyer’s failure.183 U.S. regulation has used similar 
limits, for example, by imposing lending limits on banks,184 which 
restrict the loans repayable to the bank from any given customer to an 
amount that would enable the bank to continue operating without 
being paid.185  
Several practical challenges would accompany credit exposure 
limits. For one, only systemically important firms would need to be 
regulated in this way because the failure of a non-systemically 
important firm should not lead to material externalities. In jurisdictions 
like the United States, where regulators already designate relevant 
firms as systemically important, this particular challenge should be 
minimal—although the trend under the Trump administration to 
retract the systemically important designation process could renew the 
challenge.186 
Other practical challenges, such as setting protection seller limits 
and protection buyer limits, could be more difficult. Such limits would 
need to be set for each systemically important firm.187 In an analogous 
 
 183.  See infra notes 196–99 and accompanying text (observing that a protection seller’s 
default that causes a systemically important protection buyer’s failure can cause material 
externalities). 
 184.  See, e.g., Kenneth J. Rojc, National Bank Lending Limits–A New Framework, 40 BUS. 
LAW. 903, 906–07 (1985). 
 185.  See id. at 903, 906–07 (observing that lending limits restrict national banks from lending 
more than the value of 15 percent of their unimpaired capital to a single customer). 
 186.  See, e.g., Authority To Require Supervision and Regulation of Certain Nonbank 
Financial Companies, 84 Fed. Reg. 71,740, 71,742 (Dec. 30, 2019) (codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1310 
app. A) (introducing new guidance that “substantially transforms” the SIFI designation process 
for nonbank financial institutions “to cost-effectively minimize burdens”); John Heltman, 
Prudential, the Last Nonbank SIFI, Sheds the Label, AM. BANKER (Oct. 17, 2018, 9:08 AM), 
https://www.americanbanker.com/news/prudential-the-last-nonbank-sifi-sheds-the-label [https://
perma.cc/QY74-LYEE]. 
 187.  This could be done either by regulators setting the limits by fiat or through a give-and-
take process between regulators and regulated firms. Although this Article primarily discusses 
the former, there is some precedent for the latter. Cf. Lori S. Bennear & Jonathan B. Wiener, 
Adaptive Regulation: Instrument Choice for Policy Learning over Time 7–8 (Feb. 12, 2019) 
(unpublished manuscript), https://www.hks.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/centers/mrcbg/files/
Regulation%20-%20adaptive%20reg%20-%20Bennear%20Wiener%20on%20Adaptive%20
Reg%20Instrum%20Choice%202019%2002%2012%20clean.pdf [https://perma.cc/478A-ATHX]  
(describing a process of “adaptive regulation” that “enables learning and modification of policy 
over time via adjustments informed by data collection and analysis”). The merits of any particular 
methodology designating systemically important firms are beyond the scope of this Article, but it 
is worth noting that identifying a methodology to correctly identify systemically important firms 
is itself a considerable practical challenge. An overinclusive methodology may subject firms to 
potentially harmful capital requirements without protecting the public from any material 
externalities from that firm’s failure, see Schwarcz, Too Big to Fool, supra note 119, at 779, while 
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context, U.S. regulators formulaically set equivalent limits188 and use 
the same formula for both bank standby-letter-of-credit exposure (the 
equivalent of this Article’s protection seller limit189) and bank lending 
exposure (the equivalent of this Article’s protection buyer limit190). For 
instance, “federal regulatory agencies have required banks under their 
jurisdiction to count standby[] [letters of credit] toward each 
customer’s section 84 lending limits.”191  
Perhaps the most difficult practical challenge would be identifying 
correlations. To set a protection seller limit, for example, regulators 
would have to identify correlated CDS liabilities.192 A systemically 
important firm that sells protection to different counterparties should 
count its CDS liabilities as correlated to the extent a particular, even if 
unlikely, event can synchronize their payment. Thus, although AIG 
sold protection to numerous unaffiliated protection buyers, it faced 
default when the seemingly geographically diversified MBS underlying 
many of those buyers’ CDS contracts faced a correlated loss in value 
due to widespread MBS market panic.193 In retrospect, that correlation 
might appear to have been obvious; in reality, though, it is often 
 
an underinclusive methodology will necessarily expose the public to unmitigated material 
externalities in the event of an unincluded systemically important firm’s failure.  
 188.  Cf. supra note 185 and accompanying text (referencing lending limits calculated at 15 
percent of a bank’s unimpaired capital). 
 189.  See supra notes 180–81 and accompanying text. 
 190.  See supra notes 183–85 and accompanying text. 
 191.  Kozolchyk, supra note 181, at 332–33. Although it would have to be updated on a regular 
basis to remain accurate, a more nuanced protection buyer limit might take into account not only 
the financial condition but also, to the extent not already disclosed, each protection seller’s 
contingent CDS liabilities. This could help a protection buyer assess each such protection seller’s 
ability to perform its CDS obligations. See Houman B. Shadab, Guilty by Association? Regulating 
Credit Default Swaps, 4 ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 407, 416 (2010) (arguing that disclosure of 
AIG’s liabilities as a CDS protection seller might have alerted protection buyers, and possibly 
even regulators, to the AIG situation). Imposing such a disclosure requirement on protection 
sellers should not be costly. Cf. 12 C.F.R. § 337.2(d) (2020) (providing already that “all . . . standby 
letters of credit must be adequately reflected on the bank’s published financial statements”). 
Generally accepted accounting principles already require the disclosure of certain loss 
contingencies in financial statements, although usually in notes to the statement, including 
“[g]uarantees of indebtedness of others.” FASB ACCOUNTING STANDARDS CODIFICATION 
§ 460-10-50-2 (last updated Aug. 14, 2020) (requiring disclosure even if “the possibility of loss 
may be remote”).  
 192.  See supra note 180 and accompanying text. 
 193.  See supra notes 10, 93 and accompanying text. Although immaterial to this Article’s 
analysis, AIG’s immediate default threat was, on a purely technical level, being unable to post the 
necessary mark-to-market collateral to secure its protection buyers, rather than being unable to 
pay its underlying CDS obligations to those protection buyers. See Henkel, supra note 10, at 97–
98.  
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difficult to anticipate correlations in advance.194 Indeed, “hidden 
correlations are only observable when there is full appreciation of the 
underlying variables.”195 
Similarly, to set a protection buyer limit, regulators would have to 
identify correlated CDS protection sellers.196 Those correlated entities 
normally should include all of a protection seller’s affiliates197 and any 
other members of a protection seller’s “common enterprise.”198 But 
because different criteria are relevant to setting protection seller limits 
versus setting protection buyer limits, regulators should not take the 
relatively simplistic approach—which U.S. bank regulators took in a 
different context199—of setting the same limit for both. 
The foregoing analysis has shown that limiting CDS credit 
exposure could provide substantial benefits by helping to control 
systemic externalities. Indeed, if AIG had been subject to a protection 
seller limit that restricted its aggregate credit exposure to MBS, it 
might not have faced defaulting on its CDS obligations.200  
The benefits of limiting CDS credit exposure appear to exceed its 
costs, most of which would be imposed by the above-discussed practical 
challenges. The most difficult practical challenge would be identifying 
correlations, but even imperfectly identifying them should provide real 
benefit by reducing the likelihood of a systemically important firm’s 
failure. If limiting CDS credit exposure still preserves the bulk of the 
CDS market, that market’s pricing efficiencies should continue, and 
any other costs should be marginal.201 CDS contracts still would be 
 
 194.  See supra note 95 and accompanying text. 
 195.  Schwarcz, Regulating Complexity in Financial Markets, supra note 95, at 223. During the 
late 1970s and early 1980s, for example, “investors failed to recognize an underlying correlation 
between mobile-home loans and the price of oil. An oil boom in Oklahoma drew an influx of oil 
workers, creating the nation’s fastest growing market for mobile-home loans.” Id. at 223–24. 
Then, “[w]hen oil prices crashed, drilling in Oklahoma ceased, resulting in massive 
unemployment and causing widespread defaults on the mobile-home loans.” Id. at 224. 
 196.  See supra note 183 and accompanying text. 
 197.  See, e.g., Franklin A. Gevurtz, Groups of Companies, 66 AM. J. COMPAR. L. 181, 181, 
210 (2018) (discussing the correlated creditworthiness of affiliated companies). 
 198.  Cf. Rojc, supra note 184, at 919, 921–24 (observing that loans made to a bank’s customer 
are also attributed to those with whom the customer forms a “common enterprise,” which 
includes the customer’s affiliates). 
 199.  See supra notes 189–91 and accompanying text (observing that U.S. regulators set the 
same limit for both bank standby-letter-of-credit exposure and bank-lending exposure). 
 200.  See supra note 193 and accompanying text. 
 201.  Systemically important firms still could engage in CDS transactions so long as their CDS 
exposure does not subject them to default. See supra notes 179–85 and accompanying text.  
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available to hedge credit risk with relatively low transaction cost,202 to 
provide standardization and liquidity to otherwise fragmented bond 
markets,203 and to facilitate price discovery in equity markets.204 From 
a cost-benefit standpoint, therefore, limiting credit exposure appears 
to be a viable regulatory approach for controlling the externalities 
caused by systemically risky CDS contracts that guarantee insurable 
interests. 
2. Correcting Cognitive Biases.  Correcting the cognitive biases 
that motivate protection sellers’ excessive risk-taking is another way to 
control the externalities caused by systemically risky CDS contracts.205 
Although human nature is not easily changed, studies have shown that 
cognitive biases can be addressed and sometimes improved.206 
Professors Christine Jolls and Cass Sunstein have argued, for example, 
that such biases can be regulated through an approach they call 
 
 202.  See, e.g., Anupam Chander & Randall Costa, International Law and the Economic 
Crisis: Clearing Credit Default Swaps, 10 CHI. J. INT’L L. 639, 646–47 (2010) (discussing the 
transaction-cost benefits for a reference entity of transacting in the CDS market rather than in 
the bond market itself); Douglas B. Levene, Credit Default Swaps and Insider Trading, 7 VA. L. 
& BUS. REV. 231, 252–53 (2012) (“[A] credit default swap contract is an attractive alternative to 
selling a loan or a bond[:] . . . keeping the credit on the bank’s books has benefits for managing 
the bank’s overall relationship with the client [and] . . . avoids any necessity to obtain the 
borrower’s consent to the assignment of a loan.”). 
 203.  See Martin Oehmke & Adam Zawadowski, The Anatomy of the CDS Market, 30 REV. 
FIN. STUD. 80, 103–04 (2017) (“Overall, our evidence supports the view of the CDS market as an 
alternative trading venue that [effectively facilitates financing] for firms with fragmented and 
contractually heterogeneous bonds, which are illiquid and costly to trade.”).  
 204.  See Viral V. Acharya & Timothy C. Johnson, Insider Trading in Credit Derivatives, 84 J. 
FIN. ECON. 110, 138 (2007) (providing “empirical evidence that there is an information flow from 
the credit default swap markets to equity markets”). Regulation might also inadvertently reduce 
another possible, though narrower, benefit—the ability of CDS pricing to help assess whether a 
failed leveraged buyout (“LBO”) should be avoided as constructively fraudulent. Michael 
Simkovic & Benjamin S. Kaminetzky, Leveraged Buyout Bankruptcies, the Problem of Hindsight 
Bias, and the Credit Default Swap Solution, 2011 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 118, 122 (suggesting that 
bankruptcy courts could use CDS pricing to help determine “whether a corporate debtor who has 
filed for bankruptcy was solvent” after giving effect to the LBO).  
 205.  Yet another approach to control the externalities caused by systemically risky CDS 
contracts would be to impose a public governance duty on systemically important counterparties 
to such contracts. See, e.g., supra note 173 (questioning whether managers of systemically 
important firms should have some form of a public governance duty).  
 206.  See, e.g., David Z. Hambrick & Alexander P. Burgoyne, The Difference Between 
Rationality and Intelligence, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 16, 2016), https://nyti.ms/2cM5MDU [https://
perma.cc/J3XB-KFBN] (describing a pair of studies published by psychologist Carey Morewedge 
and colleagues that found that computer training led to decreases in decision-making bias). 
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“debiasing through law.”207 The goal is to give people more control 
over their processing of information.208 Regulators could do this by 
making an event more “available” to individuals, such as by exposing 
them to a concrete instance of the event’s occurrence.209 Ironically, this 
approach uses one type of cognitive bias—availability heuristics210—to 
correct other cognitive biases.  
For example, smokers are more likely to believe that smoking will 
harm their health if they are exposed to specific, poignant, and concrete 
narratives rather than general information regarding health risks.211 
One study showed that foreign cigarette package warnings that are 
more pictorially graphic than U.S. text-only warnings are more 
effective in discouraging smoking.212 To reduce credit-card abuse, 
scholars have similarly suggested giving consumers “vivid—perhaps 
even shocking—information about real cases [of that abuse] that have 
gone wrong.”213 
These debiasing strategies can inform CDS regulation.214 For 
example, regulators might consider explicitly warning CDS protection 
sellers of optimism bias and abstraction bias.215 Even a simple reminder 
 
 207.  Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, Debiasing Through Law, 35 J. LEGAL STUD. 199, 200 
(2006). 
 208.  ROY F. BAUMEISTER & BRAD J. BUSHMAN, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY AND HUMAN 
NATURE 155 (2d ed. 2011); see Cass R. Sunstein, People Prefer System 2 Nudges (Kind of), 66 
DUKE L.J. 121, 131–32 (2016) (arguing that people are generally more receptive to requirements 
that allow them to exercise flexibility and agency than to more cut-and-dried rules such as 
requiring a display of graphics). 
 209.  Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 207, at 210. 
 210.  Availability bias is the tendency to focus on a recent or especially vivid example. 
Anabtawi & Schwarcz, Regulating Systemic Risk, supra note 88, at 1366–67. People with recently 
divorced friends, for example, tend to overestimate the divorce rate. Id. at 1367 n.72. 
 211.  Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 207, at 210. 
 212.  See generally Hua-Hie Yong, Ron Borland, James F. Thrasher, Mary E. Thompson, 
Gera E. Nagelhout, Geoffrey T. Fong, David Hammond & K. Michael Cummings, Mediational 
Pathways of the Impact of Cigarette Warning Labels on Quit Attempts, 33 HEALTH PSYCH. 1410 
(2014) (comparing Canadian, Australian, United Kingdom, and U.S. cigarette-package 
warnings). 
 213.  See, e.g., Oskari Juurikkala, The Behavioral Paradox: Why Investor Irrationality Calls 
for Lighter and Simpler Financial Regulation, 18 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 33, 56 (2012).  
 214.  Cf. Frank Partnoy, Five Years After Lehman’s Collapse, Bankers Still Haven’t 
Confronted Their Biases, HARV. BUS. REV. (Sep. 16, 2013), https://hbr.org/2013/09/five-years-
after-lehmans-collapse-bankers-still-havent-confronted-their-biases [https://perma.cc/7NSB-779A] 
(arguing that because “modern financial markets tempt human beings into cognitive error,” 
bankers should be taught the limits of human cognition). 
 215.  See supra notes 87–92 and accompanying text (discussing those biases). In this Article’s 
context, recall that optimism bias is the tendency for financial guarantors to believe they can 
quantify unquantifiable risks. Relatedly, abstraction bias is the tendency for financial guarantors 
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that cognitive biases have caused sophisticated parties to be 
devastatingly wrong in the past can encourage more critical reflection 
and accurate risk assessments.216 Regulators might also consider 
requiring credit officers of CDS protection sellers to attend lectures 
that emphasize that warning and caution against optimism and 
abstraction bias. Supplementing warnings with lectures has been 
shown to reduce cognitive biases more effectively than merely 
providing warnings.217  
Regulators also could try to reduce optimism and abstraction 
biases further by making the possibility of having to pay on the CDS 
more concrete. For example, they could consider requiring at least 
systemically important protection sellers to engage in the type of stress 
testing currently mandated for government-designated systemically 
important financial institutions (“SIFIs”).218 SIFIs must engage in 
periodic financial “stress test” scenarios219 to motivate them to consider 
the possibility of, and to better prepare for, future periods when 
 
to view their risk-taking more abstractly, and thus underestimate their risk, because they do not 
actually transfer their property at the time they make a guarantee.  
 216.  See Anabtawi & Schwarcz, Regulating Systemic Risk, supra note 88, at 1389. Although 
some may argue that after the financial crisis, financial guarantors already should see the 
possibility of another failure as “available,” the reality is that even the most sophisticated parties 
have relatively short memories when making investment decisions. See, e.g., Erik F. Gerding, The 
Next Epidemic: Bubbles and the Growth and Decay of Securities Regulation, 38 CONN. L. REV. 
393, 418, 422 (2006) (“The availability bias means that, as time passes since the last financial crisis, 
regulators and policymakers discount the potential for new crises and the need for regulations to 
avert those crises.”); cf. Larry Light, Bondholder Beware: Value Subject to Change Without 
Notice, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 29, 1993, 12:00 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/stories/1993-
03-28/bondholder-beware-value-subject-to-change-without-notice [https://perma.cc/2HSV-K6X3] 
(observing that bondholders generally chose higher interest rates, thereby “go[ing] for the gold,” 
over protective event-risk covenants within only a few years after an event that seriously harmed 
unprotected bondholders). 
 217.  See Markku Kaustia & Milla Perttula, Overconfidence and Debiasing in the Financial 
Industry, 4 REV. BEHAV. FIN. 46, 47, 57 (2012). 
 218.  To the extent systemically important protection sellers already are designated by the 
federal government as SIFIs—which may well be the case for many—this proposed stress-testing 
requirement would supplement any already-mandated stress testing. For the criteria for which 
institutions receive a SIFI designation, see Daniel Liberto, Systemically Important Financial 
Institution (SIFI), INVESTOPEDIA (Nov. 21, 2019), https://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/
systemically-important-financial-institution-sifi.asp [https://perma.cc/NW79-5MEG]. For a list of 
current SIFIs, see Global Systemically Important Financial Institutions (G-SIFIs), FIN. STABILITY 
BD., https://www.fsb.org/work-of-the-fsb/policy-development/addressing-sifis/global-systemically- 
important-financial-institutions-g-sifis [https://perma.cc/5YU8-CC38].  
 219.  BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BASEL III: A GLOBAL REGULATORY 
FRAMEWORK FOR MORE RESILIENT BANKS AND BANKING SYSTEMS 46–47 (2011) [hereinafter 
BASEL COMM., A GLOBAL REGULATORY FRAMEWORK], http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs189.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/96ZW-BSTJ]. For a discussion of SIFI designation, see supra notes 186, 218. 
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previously adequate liquidity and capital resources might prove 
inadequate.220 Officials from the Federal Reserve maintain that these 
tests create a “strong, accountable, and proactive risk culture.”221 CDS 
stress testing might posit, for example, that a protection seller is 
required to pay multiple CDS contracts simultaneously. This 
requirement would be consistent with a framing approach: by better 
understanding potential adverse outcomes, protection sellers should be 
able to assess risks more accurately.222 
From a cost-benefit standpoint, correcting cognitive biases should 
be inexpensive. As discussed, it likely would involve explicitly warning 
systemically important CDS protection sellers of optimism and 
abstraction bias and requiring their credit officers to attend lectures 
that emphasize that warning and caution against those biases. 
Additionally, it might subject those protection sellers to periodic stress 
tests that motivate them to consider the possibility of, and to better 
prepare for, having to make future payouts during financially difficult 
conditions. In contrast, correcting cognitive biases should provide 
important benefits, such as reducing optimism and abstraction bias and 
creating a “strong, accountable, and proactive risk culture.”223 
Although correcting cognitive biases would not control the 
externalities caused by systemically risky CDS contracts as clearly as 
limiting credit exposure, it should provide an important regulatory 
supplement to that approach.  
3. Setting Capital Requirements.  Another avenue to control the 
externalities caused by systemically risky CDS contracts is to set special 
capital requirements on systemically important protection sellers.224 
 
 220.  See CHRIS BRUMMER, SOFT LAW AND THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM: RULE 
MAKING IN THE 21ST CENTURY 217 (2012). 
 221.  Charles L. Evans, President & Chief Exec. Officer, Fed. Rsrv. Bank of Chi., The Call 
for Proactive Risk Culture 3 (June 3, 2015), https://www.chicagofed.org/~/media/publications/
speeches/2015/060315-chicago-banking-symposium-charles-evans-print-pdf.pdf [https://perma. cc/ 
TRY6-UQ2R] (“It is incumbent on financial institutions to serve as their own first line of defense. 
A strong risk culture enables institutions to proactively identify and manage not only broad risks, 
but also risks that are specific to their business.”).  
 222.  See Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 207, at 216 (“A strategy of debiasing through substantive 
law in response to consumers’ optimism bias is to require that firms identify the potential negative 
consequences associated with their product or a particular use of their product rather than the 
positive consequences associated with (for instance) an alternative usage.”). 
 223.  See Evans, supra note 221. 
 224.  If and when regulators gain experience with setting special capital requirements on 
systemically important protection sellers, they could consider whether also to set special capital 
requirements on systemically important protection buyers.  
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The goal would be to make such protection sellers robust enough to 
resist failure. These capital requirements could resemble—or 
supplement, in the case of protection sellers already subject to capital 
requirements—the risk-based capital requirements imposed on banks 
and other SIFIs225 and the claims-reserve requirements imposed on 
insurance companies.226 Risk-based capital requirements are intended 
to protect firms both against unexpected losses227 and against becoming 
excessively leveraged228 by requiring them to hold minimum levels of 
capital, usually equity.229  
Systemically important firms are already subject to risk-based 
capital requirements,230 and certain of those firms are subject to risk-
based capital surcharges for derivatives exposure generally.231 
Regulators should analyze whether those requirements are sufficient 
to address CDS protection-selling risk and, if not, whether additional 
risk-based capital requirements may be appropriate. As part of that 
analysis, regulators should attempt to balance the benefits and costs of 
imposing supplemental requirements, recognizing that the costs are 
uncertain. Some economists argue that risk-based capital requirements 
have little associated public cost; others argue to the contrary.232 The 
 
 225.  See BASEL COMM., A GLOBAL REGULATORY FRAMEWORK, supra note 219, at 12–29. 
 226.  A claims reserve, sometimes called a balance-sheet reserve, is an actuarially determined 
amount of money set aside by insurance companies to pay policyholders. See Daniel Liberto, 
Claims Reserve, INVESTOPEDIA (May 15, 2009), https://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/claims-
reserve.asp [https://perma.cc/9TCL-WRM7]. 
 227.  Kern Alexander & Steven L. Schwarcz, The Macroprudential Quandary: Unsystematic 
Efforts To Reform Financial Regulation, in RECONCEPTUALISING GLOBAL FINANCE AND ITS 
REGULATION 127, 136 (Ross P. Buckley, Emilios Avgouleas & Douglas W. Arner eds., 2016). 
 228.  See Hervé Hannoun, Deputy Gen. Manager, Bank for Int’l Settlements, The Basel III 
Capital Framework: A Decisive Breakthrough 10 (Nov. 22, 2010), http://www.bis.org/speeches/
sp101125a.pdf [https://perma.cc/GQ2T-VHMQ] (proposing a leverage ratio, “a simple measure 
of capital that supplements the risk-based ratio and which constrains the build-up of leverage in 
the system”).  
 229.  In its most pristine form, capital consists of equity. See id. at 3–4 (explaining why the 
Basel III regulatory framework defines capital in terms of common equity). 
 230.  See supra notes 186, 218–19, 225–26 and accompanying text (discussing SIFIs and other 
firms that are subject to risk-based capital requirements). 
 231.  See generally, e.g., Wayne Passmore & Alexander H. von Hafften, Are Basel’s Capital 
Surcharges for Global Systemically Important Banks Too Small?, 15 INT’L J. CENT. BANKING 107 
(2019) (discussing G-SIB risk-based capital surcharges).  
 232.  Compare ANAT ADMATI & MARTIN HELLWIG, THE BANKERS’ NEW CLOTHES: 
WHAT’S WRONG WITH BANKING AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 98 (2013) (arguing that higher 
capital requirements on banks would have no associated public costs), with Jean Dermine, Bank 
Regulations After the Global Financial Crisis: Good Intentions and Unintended Evil, 19 EUR. FIN. 
MGMT. 658, 662 (2013) (arguing that higher capital requirements “might lead to inefficiently 
higher interest rates on bank loans . . . [and also] induce social costs as banks reduce their supply 
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misapplication of capital requirements also could have substantial 
costs.233 Because of these uncertainties, this Article does not 
recommend setting additional risk-based capital requirements to 
control CDS protection-selling risk. 
4. Reexamining the G20 Regulatory Scheme.  Because replacing 
the G20 regulatory scheme—which purports to reflect a twenty-nation 
international regulatory consensus—is politically unrealistic at this 
stage, the foregoing regulatory approaches are intended to 
complement and enhance that scheme, imperfect as it may be. 
Consider, for example, central clearing, the principal focus of the G20 
scheme. Central clearing applies to most derivatives and is intended to 
reduce counterparty risk by ensuring the performance of a derivatives 
contract, even if a counterparty fails.234 The foregoing regulatory 
approaches would enhance central clearing by more specifically 
targeting the riskiest derivatives—systemically risky CDS contracts. 
Without arguing to replace the G20 scheme, this Article 
nonetheless critiques it. For example, the Article has observed that 
central clearing inadvertently could increase systemic risk by 
concentrating counterparty risk in the CCPs.235 Yet if central clearing 
ultimately proves to reduce systemic risk, as the G20 suggests, it 
certainly should be appropriate to clear and settle derivatives contracts 
centrally. But if this is true, then it may also be appropriate to centrally 
clear and settle other financial contracts involving systemically 
important counterparties.236 The rationales for this expanded use of 
central clearing are precisely those advocated in this Article—that 
 
of loans or securitise assets”), and Emilios Avgouleas, Bank Leverage Ratios and Financial 
Stability: A Micro- and Macroprudential Perspective 16–17 (Levy Econ. Inst. Working Paper 
No. 849, 2015), http://www.levyinstitute.org/pubs/wp_849.pdf [https://perma.cc/L5XP-TVY5] 
(arguing that higher capital requirements can create “uncertainty [that] severely undermines 
rather than reinforces market discipline”). See also Eduardo Porter, Recession’s True Cost Is Still 
Being Tallied, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 21, 2014), https://nyti.ms/1f4j1Jv [https://perma.cc/ZGW3-LJFR] 
(discussing criticisms of capital requirements). 
 233.  See Schwarcz, Too Big To Fool, supra note 119, at 779–80 (observing that capital 
requirements generally are imposed on a countercyclical basis, and the mistiming or 
misapplication of countercyclical regulation can be devastating). 
 234.  See supra notes 134–38 and accompanying text; cf. FIN. STABILITY BD., INCENTIVES TO 
CENTRALLY CLEAR, supra note 128, at 1 (“The central clearing of standardised OTC derivatives 
is a pillar of the G20 Leaders’ commitments to reform OTC derivatives markets in response to 
the financial crisis.”).  
 235.  See supra notes 148–49 and accompanying text. 
 236.  See generally Schwarcz, Central Clearing of Financial Contracts, supra note 66 (arguing 
for that broader application of central clearing, if central clearing actually reduces systemic risk).  
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derivatives contracts generally are not inherently riskier than other 
financial contracts237 and that having one or more systemically 
important counterparties can magnify counterparty risk for any 
financial contract, not just derivatives.238 However, the G20 has yet to 
adopt this expanded approach. 
In addition to central clearing, the G20 regulatory scheme includes 
two other derivatives-reform proposals: first, imposing minimum 
margin requirements for non-centrally cleared derivatives 
transactions,239 and second, requiring data reporting about OTC 
derivatives transactions to government-mandated trade repositories.240 
Again, by specifically targeting systemically risky CDS contracts, this 
Section’s regulatory approaches would supplement and augment those 
proposals. Similarly, this Article critiques those proposals without 
arguing to replace them. For example, minimum margin requirements 
can create unpredictable liquidity-funding demands, which can cause 
counterparty defaults.241 Also, even absent a regulatory requirement, 
sophisticated derivatives counterparties normally contract to post 
margin at levels appropriate to protect their interests.242 To the extent 
the minimum margin requirements impose high costs while providing 
relatively few benefits,243 they may not be advisable.  
In contrast, the G20’s proposed data reporting requirements are 
intended to increase transparency, which can be important given the 
complexity of derivatives and the fact that OTC derivatives 
transactions are privately negotiated.244 Also, reporting requirements 
 
 237.  See supra Part I.B.  
 238.  See supra Part II.B. 
 239.  See supra notes 150–64 and accompanying text.  
 240.  See Over-The-Counter Derivatives, supra note 24 (listing the G20’s 2009 derivatives 
reforms). 
 241.  See supra notes 153–54 and accompanying text. 
 242.  See supra notes 155–56 and accompanying text. 
 243.  See supra notes 156–64 and accompanying text. This Article has not independently 
assessed a possible second benefit of imposing the minimum margin requirements, which is to 
reduce international regulatory arbitrage. See BASEL COMM. ET AL., MARGIN REQUIREMENTS, 
supra note 151, at 3–4 (discussing how imposing minimum margin requirements might reduce 
regulatory arbitrage and prevent financial institutions that operate in low-margin jurisdictions 
from gaining a competitive advantage). 
 244.  See Over-The-Counter Derivatives, supra note 24 (listing the G20’s 2009 derivatives 
reforms). 
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generally have relatively low costs.245 The Article therefore favors 
those requirements.246  
C. Regulating “Naked” Systemically Risky CDS Contracts 
A naked systemically risky CDS is thought to constitute the 
riskiest type of CDS because it does not protect an insurable interest.247 
The protection buyer simply may be speculating, for example, on the 
creditworthiness of a bond it does not own.248 Some estimate that 
naked CDS contracts have “become the more prevalent use of CDS in 
the market.”249 
1. Addressing Moral Hazard.  As discussed, two risks are 
associated with naked CDS contracts—moral hazard and a multiplier 
effect.250 The moral-hazard risk appears to be exaggerated. The 
supposition is that naked CDS protection can motivate financial 
institutions to act imprudently by protecting them against the 
consequences of their actions. One industry observer, for example, 
 
 245.  See, e.g., Alex Edmans, Mirko S. Heinle & Chong Huang, The Real Costs of Financial 
Efficiency When Some Information Is Soft, 20 REV. FIN. 2151, 2155, 2168 (2016) (observing that 
the “actual act of disclosure” tends to be low cost or costless due to advances in electronic 
communication and the quantity of information produced for other purposes, but cautioning that 
“a high-disclosure policy can still be costly because of its effect on real investment”). 
 246.  At least one commentator questions, however, whether the G20 reporting requirements, 
as currently implemented, focus on reporting valuable data. See Sinead Walley, G20 Derivatives 
Regulation—Equivalence or Divergence?, ALT. INV. MGMT. ASS’N (Apr. 23, 2018), https://
www.aima.org/journal/aima-journal-edition-114/article/g20-derivatives-regulation-equivalence-
or-divergence.html [https://perma.cc/XH3W-W2RZ] (observing that only “minutiae” is “now 
being reported to trade repositories” under the G20 scheme). The extent to which the G20 
reporting requirements should be improved, especially for reporting on OTC derivatives 
transactions made up of systemically risky CDS contracts, is beyond this Article’s scope. 
 247.  See supra notes 114–23 and accompanying text. Naked systemically risky CDS contracts 
also might be riskier than other systemically risky CDS instruments because protection sellers of 
naked CDS contracts lack a subrogation claim in an underlying asset that could help to reimburse 
them. For example, a guarantor that pays a holder of a defaulted bond becomes subrogated to 
the holder’s rights in the bond. Subrogation, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). Even a 
defaulted bond may have some value to the guarantor. In naked CDS contracts, however, the 
protection buyer lacks rights in any underlying asset; therefore, there are no rights in an 
underlying asset for which the protection seller can become subrogated. In some jurisdictions, this 
distinction may be irrelevant because the law is not always clear whether CDS protection sellers 
actually have a subrogation claim after making payment. See Janis Sarra, Financial Market 
Destabilization and the Role of Credit Default Swaps: An International Perspective on the SEC’s 
Role Going Forward, 78 U. CIN. L. REV. 629, 638 (2009) (“For cash-settled CDSs, unlike 
insurance, no title to claim passes and the protection seller receives no right of subrogation.”).  
 248.  See supra notes 115–16 and accompanying text.  
 249.  Fletcher, supra note 4, at 1088. 
 250.  See supra notes 117–23 and accompanying text. 
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argues that a bank would be motivated to make risky loans if it could 
purchase CDS contracts to reduce the risk of borrower default.251 That 
argument, however, lacks business sense. No bank would be able to 
purchase creditworthy protection, at a reasonable price, for 
guaranteeing risky loans. Furthermore, that example does not even 
appear to represent naked CDS contracts.252 A related supposition is 
that CDS protection can reduce a lender’s incentives to monitor or 
accurately appraise risk.253 This similarly lacks business sense because 
no rational CDS counterparty would sell protection on loans without, 
itself, monitoring and appraising those loans.254  
2. Addressing the Multiplier Effect.  The greater risk of a naked 
systemically risky CDS is its multiplier effect. For example, naked CDS 
contracts can “allow speculators to write $10 trillion in derivative 
contracts on a $1 trillion market for mortgage bonds, just as a bookie 
can take in $100,000 in bets on a horserace with a $10,000 winner’s 
purse.”255 This enables a protection seller to leverage its CDS liabilities 
more highly compared to the amount of CDS protection it could sell 
on the underlying financial obligation alone.256 If a highly leveraged 
protection seller makes a bad bet, it may be unable to pay those 
liabilities and will default.257 If that defaulting protection seller is 
 
 251.  See supra note 122 and accompanying text.  
 252.  See supra note 122 (questioning whether that industry observer’s example even 
represents a naked CDS, given that the bank presumably is buying CDS protection on a loan it 
still owns). 
 253.  See supra note 121 and accompanying text. 
 254.  The counterargument that the lender “is in the best position to” engage in that 
monitoring, see supra note 123 and accompanying text, is naive, ignoring the reality of the massive 
financial guarantee industry. Indeed, the above moral-hazard arguments parallel the argument 
attributing much of the financial crisis’ excessive risk-taking to the so-called originate-to-
distribute model of securitization, in which originators of risky loans sell them to third parties. 
See, e.g., Amiyatosh Purnanandam, Originate-to-Distribute Model and the Subprime Mortgage 
Crisis 1 (FDIC Ctr. for Fin. Rsch., Working Paper No. 2010-08, 2010), https://www.fdic.gov/bank/
analytical/cfr/2010/wp2010/2010-08.pdf [https://perma.cc/7LU9-YN6N]. These sales are 
presumed to transfer risk on the loans away from the originators, thereby creating moral hazard 
that encourages originators to make even riskier loans. Id. That argument fails to explain, 
however, why those third parties—or why investors in and financial guarantors of securitization 
transactions sponsored by those third parties—accept that risk. 
 255.  Stout, supra note 2, at 28. 
 256.  Cf. id. (“[Naked CDS contracts] can magnify shocks in underlying markets and amplify 
them into risks that are many times larger than the underlying market itself.”). 
 257.  See John Geanakoplos, Leverage Caused the 2007–2009 Crisis, in SYSTEMIC RISK IN THE 
FINANCIAL SECTOR: TEN YEARS AFTER THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS 235, 248–51 (Douglas 
W. Arner, Emilios Avgouleas, Danny Busch & Steven L. Schwarcz eds., 2019) (arguing that 
leverage was the primary cause of the financial crisis). 
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systemically important, and thus its naked CDS is systemically risky, its 
default could threaten economic stability.258  
The approaches recommended in Section B for regulating 
systemically risky CDS transactions—setting credit exposure limits and 
correcting cognitive biases259—also should apply to regulating naked 
systemically risky CDS instruments because neither of those 
approaches is conditioned on whether the protection buyer has an 
insurable interest. Moreover, setting a credit exposure limit on 
protection sellers—or in this Article’s parlance, a protection seller 
limit—could directly control the multiplier effects of naked 
systemically risky CDS contracts and restrict a systemically important 
protection seller’s correlated CDS liabilities to an aggregate amount it 
could feasibly pay.260 Thus, setting a protection seller limit would 
control the multiplier effect’s systemic danger—even if the protection 
seller makes a bad bet, it should be able, assuming the protection seller 
limit is wisely chosen,261 to pay its naked CDS liabilities.  
With one exception, regulation setting credit exposure limits and 
correcting cognitive biases for naked systemically risky CDS contracts 
should have the same costs and benefits as regulation setting those 
limits and debiasing those biases for the other systemically risky CDS 
contracts discussed in Section B. The costs and benefits should be the 
same because neither of these regulatory approaches turns on whether 
the protection buyer has an insurable interest. From a cost-benefit 
standpoint, therefore, these regulatory approaches also should be 
appropriate for controlling the externalities caused by naked 
systemically risky CDS contracts. The exception makes this conclusion 
even stronger. Setting credit exposure limits—particularly protection 
seller limits—would provide even greater benefit for naked 
systemically risky CDS contracts by controlling the multiplier effect.  
3. Considering a Ban.  Another possible approach to regulating 
naked systemically risky CDS contracts would be simply to ban them. 
Regulators could do this, for example, by imposing an insurable-
interest requirement on all systemically risky CDS contracts. Some 
 
 258.  See supra note 166 and accompanying text (defining CDS contracts that have one or 
more systemically important counterparties as systemically risky CDS contracts). 
 259.  Recall that this Article does not yet recommend a third possible approach—setting 
capital requirements. Supra notes 230–33 and accompanying text.  
 260.  See supra notes 179–80 and accompanying text. 
 261.  See supra notes 187–95 and accompanying text (analyzing how to set the limit). 
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commentators advocate a ban,262 and the European Union (“EU”) 
already has banned the issuance of naked CDS contracts on sovereign 
debt issued by the EU or its member states.263 
This Article is agnostic on whether naked systemically risky CDS 
contracts should be banned. As discussed below, there is insufficient 
information to estimate the cost-benefit outcome of a ban. Even 
assuming that a ban on naked systemically risky CDS instruments 
would considerably further reduce systemic externalities beyond the 
reduction achieved by setting credit exposure limits and correcting 
cognitive biases, the costs of such a ban would include eliminating the 
pricing and other efficiencies of those contracts.  
There is unresolved controversy, though, whether naked CDS 
contracts actually provide efficiencies and if so, to what extent.264 Some 
argue, for example, that the sole purpose of naked CDS contracts is 
speculation, which provides no efficiencies.265 A prominent derivatives 
scholar thus contends that because naked CDS contracts do not 
“provide price discovery benefits,” they cannot “provide[] important 
external social benefits in the form of more liquid markets and more 
accurate or ‘efficient’ market prices.”266 Although those types of 
benefits might result from “[e]xchange-based trading in which multiple 
buyers and sellers post their bid and ask prices produc[ing] price 
 
 262.  See, e.g., Wolfgang Münchau, Time To Outlaw Naked Credit Default Swaps, FIN. TIMES 
(Feb. 28, 2010), https://on.ft.com/3gb7fjB [https://perma.cc/3S77-EGXH]; cf. Hazen, supra note 
145, at 134–35 (suggesting that although the “justification” for imposing the insurable-interest 
requirement to insurance policies “is paternalism,” which “is controversial since it sacrifices 
freedom of contract for what policy makers deem to be consistent with ‘the common good,’” 
“policy makers have wisely recognized that a paternalistic approach is appropriate when dealing 
with risk-shifting using insurance products [and the] justifications for substantive regulation of 
insurance contracts may be equally applicable to derivatives regulation”). 
 263.  Raphael M. Russo, Europe Restricts “Naked” Credit Default Swaps and Short Sales, 
HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Dec. 27, 2011), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2011/
12/27/europe-restricts-naked-credit-default-swaps-and-short-sales [https://perma.cc/SDV2-J5AX]. 
 264.  Cf. supra notes 201–04 and accompanying text (discussing the pricing efficiencies of non-
naked CDS instruments). 
 265.  See, e.g., Münchau, supra note 262 (“A naked CDS purchase means that you take out 
insurance on bonds without actually owning them. It is a purely speculative gamble. There is not 
one social or economic benefit.”). Professor Hazen similarly suggests that CDS contracts should 
be regulated like insurance in order to reduce moral hazard. Hazen, supra note 145, at 130–31. 
That would have the practical effect of prohibiting naked CDS contracts. Mr. Charap observes, 
as a matter of positive law, that the Dodd-Frank Act prohibits CDS contracts from being 
regulated as insurance contracts under state insurance laws. Charap, supra note 118, at 156. 
 266.  Stout, supra note 2, at 30–31 (making this argument for all OTC derivatives trading, 
which includes naked CDS contracts). 
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quotations that can be made publicly available,”267 naked CDS 
speculation “involves private, bilateral agreements entered between 
parties with no obligation to report either the fact of their transaction, 
or their transaction terms, to the outside world.”268 
Others argue, in contrast, that selling naked CDS protection can 
make markets more robust. Sam Jones, a prominent industry observer, 
contends that even without price discovery, “there is a palpable social 
and economic benefit to naked CDS positions.”269 Using the sovereign 
bond market as an example, Jones observes that in 2004, some hedge 
funds invested in buying naked CDS protection, for a relatively low 
fee, against the possibility of defaults on sovereign bonds—which the 
hedge funds did not own—of the Eurozone’s financially weakest 
member states, including Greece.270 The hedge funds believed that the 
interest rates on Greek bonds were too low and that eventually 
investors would appreciate that nation’s risk, causing the prices on 
those Greek bonds to fall.271 The hedge funds then purchased at those 
discounted prices Greek bonds that matched, as closely as feasible, the 
protection on their naked CDS contracts.272 This helped stabilize the 
price of Greek debt when few other investors were willing to purchase 
those bonds.273 The naked CDS, in other words, facilitated a form of 
arbitrage to help correct imperfect market pricing. For this and other 
reasons, several derivatives scholars agree that naked CDS contracts 
can provide pricing efficiencies, even without price discovery.274  
This Article therefore recommends setting credit exposure limits 
and correcting cognitive biases to regulate naked systemically risky 
CDS contracts. Because the G20’s regulatory scheme does not turn on 
 
 267.  Id. at 31. 
 268.  Id.  
 269.  Sam Jones, The Benefits of Naked CDS, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 2, 2010, 3:59 AM), 
https://ftalphaville.ft.com/2010/03/02/161556/the-benefits-of-naked-cds [https://perma.cc/6HUK-
RCXE]. 
 270.  Id.  
 271.  Id. Greek bond prices would fall if investors eventually appreciate that the interest rates 
on those bonds would not fully compensate them. Those investors, therefore, would only offer a 
discounted price to purchase those bonds. 
 272.  Jones, supra note 269. 
 273.  Id. (“[T]he boon from hedge funds looking to hoover-up Greek debt is undeniable.”). 
 274.  See Feder, supra note 63, at 719 (“Theoretically, a market can have a perfect balance of 
natural long and short hedgers; realistically, however, speculators fill a counterparty void.”); 
Lynch, Gambling by Another Name, supra note 120, at 118–19 (“There is little doubt that 
speculators add liquidity to the derivatives markets. Most importantly, without speculators, 
potential hedgers would have to find other hedgers with an exactly (or nearly exactly) opposite 
position . . . . Finding such hedgers . . . may be costly and often impossible.”). 
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whether a CDS contract guarantees an insurable interest, these 
regulatory recommendations should supplement the G20 regulatory 
scheme to the same extent discussed in Section B.275 
D. Regulating Failures 
Absent banning all systemically risky CDS contracts, which this 
Article does not advocate,276 even the best regulatory efforts cannot 
completely eliminate CDS risk. Limiting credit exposure, for example, 
is unlikely to prevent the occasional failure of systemically important 
counterparties. Nor is human nature well enough understood to 
completely avoid the influence of cognitive biases, such as optimism 
and abstraction biases. 
Regulation therefore should not only try to prevent systemically 
important failures, as discussed in Sections B and C above, but should 
also try to mitigate the harm that inevitable failures can cause. This 
dual approach takes inspiration from chaos theory, which holds that in 
complex engineering systems—as well as in complex financial 
systems—failures are almost inevitable.277 Therefore, CDS regulation 
should also focus on limiting the harmful consequences of those 
failures.278 Although a comprehensive analysis of such limitations 
would be lengthier than this Article allows, a few observations may be 
in order.  
 U.S. law provides important regulatory precedents for limiting 
the harmful consequences of failures by requiring firms that are subject 
to consequential failures to mutualize their risk—that is, to share the 
 
 275.  More specifically, this Article’s recommendations for regulating naked systemically 
risky CDS contracts should supplement the G20 regulatory scheme to the same extent this Article 
has argued that its recommendations for regulating systemically risky CDS contracts guaranteeing 
an insurable interest should supplement it. 
 276.  Cf. supra notes 262–74 and accompanying text (advocating against a ban of naked 
systemically risky CDS contracts and explaining why it is difficult to assess the merits of such a 
ban). 
 277.  See Schwarcz, Regulating Complexity in Financial Markets, supra note 95, at 248–49. One 
aspect of chaos theory is deterministic chaos in dynamic systems, which recognizes that the more 
complex the system, the more likely it is that failures will occur. Id. at 248. Thus, the most 
successful (complex) systems are those in which the consequences of failures are limited. Id. In 
engineering design, for example, such consequences are limited by decoupling systems through 
modularity that helps to reduce a chance that a failure in one part of the system will trigger a 
failure in another part. Id.  
 278.  Cf. Iman Anabtawi & Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Ex Post: How Law Can Address 
the Inevitability of Financial Failure, 92 TEX. L. REV. 75, 92, 102 (2013) (developing that argument 
for limiting the harmful consequences of inevitable systemic shocks). 
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risk among multiple parties.279 In the banking industry, for example, 
the U.S. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”) requires 
that deposit-taking banks mutualize their risk by paying into a fund 
that reimburses the FDIC for guaranteeing deposit accounts.280 The 
FDIC guarantee limits the harm to depositors caused by a bank’s 
default and thus reduces the chances of harmful bank runs.281 To 
compensate for possible reactor accidents in the nuclear industry, the 
Price-Anderson Act likewise requires each owner of a nuclear reactor 
to share the risk by contributing collectively to a multi-billion-dollar 
self-insurance fund.282 In the traditional insurance industry, states 
typically require insurers share the risk by contributing collectively to 
a fund that ensures policyholders are paid even if an insurer fails.283 In 
the derivatives industry itself, central clearing already represents a 
form of risk mutualization to limit counterparty risk.284 
 To further mutualize CDS risk, regulators could consider 
requiring systemically important CDS protection sellers to pay into a 
CDS-payment protection fund. The fund would be available to pay 
protection buyers in the event of a protection seller’s default. 
Furthermore, requiring those CDS protection sellers to make up-front 
payments to the fund might even help to reduce their abstraction 
bias.285  
 Some argue that requiring firms to pay into risk-mutualizing 
funds could create moral hazard by protecting them against their own 
risky action.286 There is, however, a strong argument to the contrary. 
 
 279.  Schwarcz, Central Clearing of Financial Contracts, supra note 66, at 1365.  
 280.  See 12 U.S.C. § 1811 (2018). 
 281.  See, e.g., Steven A. Ramirez, The Law and Macroeconomics of the New Deal at 70, 62 
MD. L. REV. 515, 543–44 (2003). 
 282.  U.S. NUCLEAR REG. COMM’N, NUCLEAR INSURANCE AND DISASTER RELIEF 1 (2019), 
https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML0327/ML032730606.pdf [https://perma.cc/2CKP-5PP3].  
 283.  See, e.g., Martin F. Grace & Hal S. Scott, An Optional Federal Charter for Insurance: 
Rationale and Design, in THE FUTURE OF INSURANCE REGULATION IN THE UNITED STATES 55, 
90–91 (Martin F. Grace & Robert W. Klein eds., 2009) (comparing state insurance funds with the 
FDIC deposit fund). 
 284.  Schwarcz, Central Clearing of Financial Contracts, supra note 66, at 1331, 1365.  
 285.  See supra text accompanying notes 89–90 (describing abstraction bias). 
 286.  For example, the idea of a risk-mutualizing systemic risk fund was originally included in 
the bill that would become the Dodd-Frank Act. H.R. 4173, 111th Cong. § 210(n) (as introduced 
in House of Representatives, Dec. 2, 2009) (proposing a “Systemic Dissolution Fund” for winding 
down failed financial companies that pose a “systemic threat,” with the fund to be maintained by 
“risk-based assessments” on large financial institutions). While the original bill did not set a limit 
on the size of the fund, id. § 210(n)(5), a parallel Senate bill would have set the target size of the 
fund at $50 billion, S. 3217, 111th Cong. § 210(n)(5) (as printed Apr. 29, 2010). Senator Richard 
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The very requirement to pay into a risk-mutualizing fund, such as a 
CDS-payment protection fund maintained by protection sellers, should 
motivate those parties to monitor and help control each other’s risk-
taking. Controlling that risk-taking would help avoid depleting the 
fund, thereby saving those parties from having to pay additional 
amounts to replenish the fund.287  
 Regulators also might consider limiting the harmful 
consequences of the failures of systemically important CDS 
counterparties by requiring those parties to “reinsure” their guarantee 
liabilities, as do traditional insurance companies. Reinsurance refers to 
insurers contractually transferring portions of their risk, especially in 
the case of major catastrophes, to other parties, known as reinsurers. 
Reinsurance enables an insurer to pay its policyholders.288 It also helps 
to prevent an insurer from failing by enabling it to recover all or part 
of the payments it makes to its insured policyholders.289 A complete 
analysis of reinsurance, which is highly specialized, is beyond this 
Article’s scope.290 
 This Article therefore recommends targeted derivatives 
regulation, a model for which is in the Appendix, that would limit the 
credit exposure of systemically important CDS counterparties, try to 
correct the cognitive biases that motivate excessive risk-taking by those 
counterparties, and try to mitigate any harm to the public caused by 
 
Shelby pushed through an amendment to the Senate bill, arguing that the $50 billion “honey pot” 
would increase moral hazard by institutionalizing bailouts at the cost of “innocent taxpaying 
American families.” See 156 CONG. REC. 7222 (2010) (statement of Sen. Richard Shelby) (“Wall 
Street gamblers . . . are happy to enjoy the upside but want to socialize the downside.”); id. at 
7231, 7308, 7310 (recording the passage of Senate Amendment 3827, which contained provisions 
striking the target value of the fund and the initial capitalization from risk-based assessments on 
large financial institutions). For a discussion of the moral-hazard debate over government deposit 
insurance of banks, see generally Thomas M. Hoenig, Vice Chairman, FDIC, Deposit Insurance: 
Addressing Its Moral Hazard Effect (Oct. 11, 2017), https://www.fdic.gov/news/news/speeches/
spoct1117.pdf [https://perma.cc/R4M4-FYSL]. 
 287. Steven L. Schwarcz, Controlling Financial Chaos: The Power and Limits of Law, 2012 
WIS. L. REV. 815, 831. CDS protection buyers could further protect themselves by requiring their 
protection sellers to put up collateral, which is marked to market. Shadab, supra note 191, at 436. 
This type of requirement, however, could be very expensive. 
 288. See AM. ACAD. OF ACTUARIES CATASTROPHE MGMT. WORK GRP., CATASTROPHE 
EXPOSURE AND INSURANCE INDUSTRY CATASTROPHE MANAGEMENT PRACTICES 7–15 (2001), 
https://www.actuary.org/sites/default/files/pdf/casualty/catastrophe_061001.pdf [https://perma.cc/
QA5T-ETTL]. 
 289. Id. 
 290. For an overview of reinsurance and its costs and benefits, see Daniel Schwarcz & Steven 
L. Schwarcz, Regulating Systemic Risk in Insurance, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 1569, 1613–18 (2014). 
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inevitable CDS-market failures. These recommendations should 
complement the G20 regulatory scheme. 
CONCLUSION 
The perception that derivatives are exotic and uniquely risky 
financial instruments has given rise to a regulatory patchwork 
described as confusing, incomplete, and contradictory. This Article 
rethinks how derivatives should be regulated.291 In contrast to much 
existing scholarship, which analyzes derivatives under somewhat 
arcane industry-derived categories, the Article deconstructs 
derivatives by their economic functions into two categories of 
traditional legal instruments—option contracts and guarantees. Like 
these instruments, most derivatives are neither exotic nor uniquely 
risky.  
The Article explains why the potential for derivatives to create 
very significant risk is primarily limited to CDS contracts, the category 
of derivatives that function as financial guarantees. The Article also 
explains why financial guarantee risk, and thus CDS risk, is magnified 
when the contract has one or more systemically important 
counterparties, which is typical of CDS contracts. Moreover, the 
absence of an insurable-interest requirement under some CDS 
contracts can even further magnify that risk.292  
The Article then analyzes how CDS contracts that have one or 
more systemically important counterparties should be regulated and 
how the absence of an insurable interest should affect that regulation. 
Recognizing that even the best regulation cannot eliminate CDS risk, 
the Article also examines how to regulate the failures that inevitably 
will occur.  
 
 291. This Article analyzes how to regulate, not who should regulate, derivatives. For example, 
it does not analyze which regulatory bodies should set protection seller limits and protection 
buyer limits. See supra notes 187–91 and accompanying text. Others have examined, and continue 
to analyze, who should regulate derivatives. Compare BARR ET AL., supra note 120, at 1168–71, 
1177–79 (discussing the jurisdictional “fight over OTC derivatives regulation” in the United 
States), and id. at 1179–80 (discussing the coordination of an international regulatory response), 
with Hazen, supra note 145, at 135 (“The overlapping nature of the sophisticated financial markets 
makes it difficult to identify the most natural regulator. It follows that instead, we should look for 
the most suitable regulator in terms of expertise and understanding of the complex financial and 
derivatives markets.”). 
 292. See supra notes 118–19 and accompanying text (describing the insurable-interest 
requirement and how it helps reduce moral hazard). 
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Finally, the Appendix proposes the text of a model law to 
implement the Article’s regulatory recommendations. The model law 
is intended to complement and enhance the existing G20 regulatory 
scheme for derivatives, which is followed by the United States and 
many other countries.293 This follows the well-respected approach of 
building normative legal improvements onto an established positive 
law foundation.  
Calls for derivatives regulation are understandable; 
underregulation doubtless contributed to the 2007–2008 financial 
crisis, and regulatory solutions could doubtless help prevent future 
crises. But regulators must understand and differentiate the types of 
derivatives and their potential risk in order to craft meaningful 
solutions. Such solutions should address derivatives risk that threatens 
economic stability, without impairing the risk-shifting benefits of the 
derivatives market as a whole. 
  
 
 293. The G20’s principal regulatory goal, for example, is to require central clearing of most 
derivatives contracts; this is intended to reduce counterparty, and thus systemic, risk by ensuring 
the performance of a derivatives contract even if a counterparty fails. See supra notes 125–37 and 
accompanying text. This Article’s three regulatory approaches would supplement, and thereby 
augment, central clearing by specifically targeting the riskiest derivatives—systemically risky CDS 
contracts. Except as observed, this Article does not independently assess the merits of central 
clearing. The Article has noted, however, that central clearing inadvertently could increase 
systemic risk by concentrating counterparty risk. See supra note 234 and accompanying text. If 
central clearing actually reduces systemic risk, it should be appropriate not only, as the G20 
suggests, for derivatives but also for all large financial contracts with systemically important 
counterparties. See supra notes 235–38 and accompanying text.  
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APPENDIX: MODEL REGULATORY LANGUAGE  
IMPLEMENTING THIS ARTICLE’S RECOMMENDATIONS294 
Preamble 
This Law applies to credit-default swap (“CDS”) contracts that 
have one or more systemically important counterparties. These 
contracts can cause significant public harm if a systemically important 
protection seller’s default leads to its failure or if protection-seller 
defaults cause a systemically important protection buyer’s failure. To 
control that harm, this Law limits the credit exposure of systemically 
important counterparties on CDS contracts and establishes procedures 
to help correct the cognitive biases that motivate excessive risk-taking 
by those counterparties.  
Chapter I: Scope, Interpretation, and Definitions 
Article 1: Scope and Interpretation 
(1) This Law applies to all CDS contracts, whether or not they 
guarantee insurable interests. It shall supplement, and not restrict, 
the application of other laws and regulations that apply to CDS 
contracts. 
(2) The CDS Regulator may issue such rules and regulations as may 
be necessary to administer and interpret this Law. 
(3) This Law shall be liberally construed to promote its remedial 
purposes described in the Preamble.  
Article 2: Definitions  
In this Law, the following terms shall have the following meanings: 
(1) “CDS” and “CDS contract” each means a credit-default swap, 
which includes any contractual or other arrangement in which a 
protection seller agrees, in exchange for the payment of a fee or 
other consideration by or on behalf of a protection buyer, to 
assume or otherwise guarantee credit risk with respect to debt 
obligations.  
 
 294. [The bracketed footnotes to this Law are solely informational.]  
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(2) “CDS Regulator” means [name(s) of government agency or other 
body with primary regulatory authority under this Law295]. 
(3) “CDS Risk Officer” shall have the meaning set forth in Ch. IV, 
Art. 1(1) of this Law. 
(4) “Cognitive bias” means an implicit simplification of a person’s 
perception of reality, and includes optimism bias (in this context, 
the tendency of protection sellers to believe they can quantify 
unquantifiable risks) and abstraction bias (in this context, the 
tendency of protection sellers to underestimate risk because they 
do not actually transfer funds at the time they enter into a CDS 
contract). 
(5) “Common enterprise” means the relationship existing between 
two or more protection sellers when— 
(a) such protection sellers are related directly or indirectly 
through common control; or 
(b) the CDS Regulator determines, based upon an evaluation of 
facts and circumstances (including substantial financial 
interdependence or an “affiliate” relationship under 
applicable accounting standards296), that a common enterprise 
exists between such protection sellers.297  
(6) “Correlated” means that an event triggering a protection seller’s 
payment obligations under a CDS contract is or may be related to 
one or more events triggering that protection seller’s payment 
obligations under other CDS contracts, as determined by the CDS 
Regulator.  
(7) “Counterparty” means a party to a CDS contract, whether as 
protection seller or protection buyer.  
 
 295. [In the United States, this could be the CFTC and SEC.  See Derivatives, SEC (May 4, 
2015), https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/dodd-frank/derivatives.shtml [https://perma.cc/M7GU-VTUB] 
(describing distribution of swap agreement oversight between the CFTC and SEC). It might also 
include appropriate Federal banking agencies, such as the Office of the Comptroller of the 
Currency, the FDIC, or Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.] 
 296. [Cf. 12 C.F.R. pt. 252 (2020) (discussing the inclusion of affiliates as counterparties for 
single-counterparty credit-limit purposes).] 
 297. [Cf. id. § 32.5(c) (defining “common enterprise” for the purpose of bank lending limits).] 
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(8) “Insurable interest” means an interest of the protection buyer to 
receive payments under debt obligations guaranteed by a CDS 
contract.  
(9) “Notional amount” means the principal and accrued interest on 
debt obligations guaranteed by CDS contracts.298  
(10) “Protection buyer” means the party to a CDS contract for which 
the protection seller agrees to assume or otherwise guarantee 
credit risk with respect to debt obligations.  
(11) “Protection buyer limit” means the lowest aggregate amount of 
CDS protection that, if unpaid when due, would impair the ability 
of a protection buyer to continue operating. 
(12) “Protection seller” means the party to a CDS contract that agrees 
to assume or otherwise guarantee credit risk with respect to debt 
obligations.  
(13) “Protection seller limit” means the lowest aggregate amount of 
CDS protection that, if required to be paid simultaneously, would 
impair the ability of a protection seller to continue operating.  
(14) “Stress testing program” means the CDS-specific stress testing 
program implemented by Ch. IV, Art. 2 of this Law. 
(15) “Systemically important” means any firm or other entity 
identified as systemically important by [name of relevant 
government agency or other body299]. 
(16) “Violation” shall include noncompliance. 
Chapter II: Protection Seller Limit 
Article 1: Scope  
(1) This Chapter applies to any systemically important protection 
seller. 
 
 298. [See supra notes 96, 178 (observing that because CDS contracts guarantee debt 
obligations, their notional amount is the principal and accrued interest outstanding on those 
obligations).] 
 299. [In the United States, this would be the Financial Stability Oversight Council (“FSOC”). 
See Designations, U.S. DEP’T TREASURY, https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-
markets-financial-institutions-and-fiscal-service/fsoc/designations [https://perma.cc/44NW-CTA6].] 
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(2) The protection seller limit in this Chapter applies independently 
of any applicable lending limit.300  
Article 2: Limit on CDS Exposure as Protection Seller 
(1) A systemically important protection seller shall not permit the 
notional amount of any correlated exposure outstanding under 
CDS contracts to exceed its protection seller limit.  
(2) If for reasons beyond its control, the notional amount of a 
protection seller’s correlated exposure outstanding exceeds its 
protection seller limit under clause (1), such protection seller shall 
use its best efforts to reduce that exposure into conformity with its 
protection seller limit within 90 calendar days.  
Article 3: Determination of Protection Seller Limit 
(1) The protection seller limit shall be determined by the CDS 
Regulator, in consultation with the protection seller, as of the last 
business day of each preceding calendar year or, if so requested 
by the CDS Regulator, more frequently.  
(2) Such determination shall take into account all relevant facts and 
circumstances, including the results of the stress testing program. 
Chapter III: Protection Buyer Limit 
Article 1: Scope  
(1) This Chapter applies to any systemically important protection 
buyer. 
(2) The protection buyer limit in this Chapter applies independently 
of any applicable lending limit.301  
 
 300. [In the United States, these lending limits are imposed under 12 U.S.C. § 84 (2018), which 
limits a bank’s extensions of credit to any one person to 15 percent of the bank’s capital and 
surplus (with additional 10 percent lending availability for loans fully secured by readily 
marketable collateral). Section 84 lending limits include derivatives exposure. Id. § 84(b); 12 
C.F.R. pt. 32. The Dodd-Frank Act and subsequent regulation imposed single-counterparty credit 
limits for the largest bank holding companies and foreign banking organizations. Dodd-Frank 
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, 1376–
2223, 1427 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5365(e)); 12 C.F.R. pt. 252).]  
 301. [These lending limits in the United States are discussed supra note 300.] 
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Article 2: Limit on CDS Exposure as Protection Buyer 
(1) A systemically important protection buyer shall not permit the 
total outstanding notional amount of CDS protection bought 
from any protection seller or from protection sellers representing 
a common enterprise to exceed its protection buyer limit.  
(2) If for reasons beyond its control (including an unforeseeable 
merger or acquisition of protection sellers that creates, or 
increases the CDS exposure of, a common enterprise), the total 
outstanding notional amount of a protection buyer’s CDS 
protection exceeds its protection buyer limit under clause (1), 
such protection buyer shall use its best efforts to reduce that total 
protection into conformity with its protection buyer limit within 
90 calendar days.  
Article 3: Determination of Protection Buyer Limit 
(1) The protection buyer limit shall be determined by the CDS 
Regulator, in consultation with the protection buyer, as of the last 
business day of each preceding calendar year or, if so requested 
by the CDS Regulator, more frequently.  
(2) Such determination shall take into account all relevant facts and 
circumstances, including consideration of any collateral securing 
the obligations of protection sellers to pay the protection buyer.  
Chapter IV: Debiasing and Stress Testing 
Article 1: CDS Risk Officer and Education Program 
(1) Each systemically important protection seller shall designate a 
senior compliance officer as its CDS Risk Officer. 
(2) The CDS Risk Officer shall be responsible for designing and 
implementing an education program of mandatory quarterly 
lectures and readings on the risks and cognitive biases attendant 
to CDS transactions, and shall provide the syllabus of such 
education program annually to the CDS Regulator. Such 
education program shall include, without limitation, narrative 
information on the 2007–2008 global financial crisis, American 
International Group’s near-failure due to CDS exposure, the 
impact of these events on the careers of managers involved with 
CDS contracts, and the limits of financial modeling. 
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(3) The CDS Risk Officer shall certify annually to the CDS Regulator 
that all of the protection seller’s credit officers, traders, and other 
similar employees and contractors who are responsible for 
transactions involving CDS contracts have successfully satisfied 
the requirements of that education program.  
(4) The CDS Risk Officer shall be responsible for approving all CDS 
protection sold by the protection seller. Such approval process 
shall take into account reasonably worst-case scenarios and 
potential risks. 
Article 2: Stress Testing Program  
(1) Each systemically important protection seller shall annually 
conduct a stress testing program for its CDS contracts.302  
(2) For each correlated exposure, the stress testing program shall 
assume that the protection seller must simultaneously pay all of its 
CDS obligations triggered by that exposure.  
(3) For each correlated exposure, the stress testing program also shall 
assume that the protection seller must simultaneously post all 
collateral required to meet margin requirements triggered by that 
exposure. 
(4) The stress testing program will model any remaining CDS 
exposure under economic conditions at least as difficult as those 
that occurred during the Great Depression and the global 
financial crisis.  
(5) The CDS Risk Officer shall distribute the results of the stress 
testing program to all of the protection seller’s credit officers, 
traders, and other similar employees and contractors who are 
responsible for transactions involving CDS contracts. In such 
distribution, the CDS Risk Officer shall highlight the potential for 
CDS and other financial guarantee transactions to result in actual 
property transfers, including the posting of collateral.  
 
 302. [Cf. 12 U.S.C. § 5365(i) (requiring annual stress tests for nonbank financial companies 
supervised by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and banks with $250 billion 
or more in assets); 12 C.F.R. § 252.45 (allowing the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System to require additional submissions for stress tests); BASEL COMM., A GLOBAL 
REGULATORY FRAMEWORK, supra note 219, at 46–47 (describing stress test requirements).] 
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(6) The CDS Risk Officer also shall certify the results of the stress 
testing program in a report submitted annually to the CDS 
Regulator,303 which shall publish that report on its website. 
Chapter V: Penalties for Violation 
Article 1: Violation by Protection Seller 
(1) If a protection seller violates any provision of this Law, it shall 
pay to the CDS Regulator a penalty, for each day such violation 
remains uncured, equal to [_]% of the notional amount of its 
then-outstanding total exposure under CDS contracts.304 
(2) If a protection seller continues to violate a provision of this Law 
for more than 120 days, the CDS Regulator may suspend that 
protection seller’s right to sell protection until the violation is 
cured and also may require that protection seller to disclose risks, 
economic information, and incentives for each CDS transaction to 
all relevant counterparties.305  
(3) The failure of a protection seller to reduce its correlated exposure 
into conformity with the protection seller limit within 90 calendar 
days, as required by Ch. II, Art. 2(2), shall not constitute a 
violation of this Law so long as such protection seller is continuing 
to use its best efforts to bring its correlated exposure into such 
conformity. 
Article 2: Violation by Protection Buyer 
(1) If a protection buyer violates any provision of this Law, it shall 
pay to the CDS Regulator a penalty, for each day such violation 
remains uncured, equal to [_]% of the notional amount of its 
then-outstanding total CDS protection bought.306 
(2) If a protection buyer continues to violate a provision of this Law 
for more than 120 days, the CDS Regulator may suspend that 
 
 303. [Cf. 7 U.S.C. § 6s(k)(3) (2018) (requiring the chief compliance officer of a swap dealer 
or major swap participant to submit an annual report on compliance procedures to the CFTC).] 
 304. [The relevant percentage should be material enough to constitute a meaningful penalty 
but still small enough not to jeopardize the protection seller’s financial condition.]  
 305. [Cf. 17 C.F.R. § 23.431 (2020) (requiring disclosure of a swap’s risks and contractual 
qualities, as well as the swap dealer’s incentives, when a swap dealer trades uncleared swaps with 
a counterparty other than another registered swap dealer or major swap participant).]  
 306. [The relevant percentage should be material enough to constitute a meaningful penalty 
but still small enough not to jeopardize the protection buyer’s financial condition.] 
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protection buyer’s right to buy protection until the violation is 
cured.  
(3) The failure of a protection buyer to bring its total protection into 
conformity with the protection buyer limit within 90 calendar 
days, as required by Ch. III, Art. 2(2), shall not constitute a 
violation of this Law so long as such protection buyer is 
continuing to use its best efforts to bring its total protection into 
such conformity. 
Article 3: Violation by CDS Risk Officer 
(1) If the CDS Regulator determines that a CDS Risk Officer is 
violating any provision of this Law, it may require the relevant 
protection seller to designate a different CDS Risk Officer.  
(2) The CDS Regulator may impose a civil penalty of [$ ] per day per 
violation on any CDS Risk Officer that the CDS Regulator 
determines is violating any provision of this Law.307 
(3) The failure of a protection seller to monitor and require its CDS 
Risk Officer to comply with this Law shall itself constitute a 
violation by such protection seller for purposes of Art. 1 of this 
Chapter. 
 
 307. [The relevant amount should be material enough to constitute a meaningful penalty but 
still small enough not to deter capable managers from wishing to serve as CDS Risk Officers.] 
